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"This old but little used section is a kind of legal Lohengrin;
although it has been with us since the First Judiciary Act, no one
seems to know whence it came. "'
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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 29, 2004, the United States Supreme Court issued its
long-awaited decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.2 The Court's
opinion addressed for the first time in substantive detail Section
1350 of Title 28 of the U.S. Code. The so-called "Alien Tort
Claims Act" ("ATCA") provides "[t]he district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States."3 Largely dormant from the time of its inclusion by
the U.S. Congress in the Judiciary Act of 1789, the ATCA has
proven contentious since its reinvigoration as a tool by which alien
plaintiffs sought to hold foreign government officials liable in the
United States for human rights violations.' Its more recent
2. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
4. See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996); Kadic v. Karadzic,
70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos (In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos
Human Rights Litigation), 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994); Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d
876 (2d Cir. 1980); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995); Forti v. Suarez-
Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
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utilization against transnational corporations for complicity in
abuses associated with their foreign investment activities has
created controversy between human rights advocates6 and business
interests.7 Nevertheless, a body of ATCA jurisprudence has
emerged from the opinions of lower federal courts confronted with
the activities of transnational corporations, often in locations with
long histories of disregard for even the most fundamental of
human rights.8
5. For purposes of this article, a "transnational corporation" is defined as "an
economic entity operating in more than one country or a cluster of economic entities
operating in two or more countries - whatever their legal form, whether in their home
country or country of activity and whether taken individually or collectively." ESCOR,
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 20, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2/2003 (Aug. 13, 2003).
6. For articles praising the use of the ATCA against transnational corporations, see,
e.g., Logan M. Breed, Regulating Our 21st Century Ambassadors: A New Approach to
Corporate Liability for Human Rights Violations Abroad, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 1005 (2002);
William S. Dodge, Which Torts in Violation of the Law of Nations?, 24 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 351 (2001); Sarah M. Hall, Multinational Corporations' Post-Unocal
Liabilities for Violations of International Law, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 401 (2002);
Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human Rights,
20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 45 (2002); Beth Stephens, Taking Pride in International Human
Rights Litigation, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 485 (2001).
7. For articles criticizing the use of the ATCA against transnational corporations,
see, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article I1, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 587
(2002); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts and the Incorporation of
International Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2260 (1998); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L.
Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the
Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 816 (1997); Ivan Poullaos, Note, The Nature of the
Beast: Using the Alien Tort Claims Act to Combat International Human Rights Violations,
80 WASH. U. L.Q. 327 (2002); Courtney Shaw, Note, Uncertain Justice: Liability of
Multinationals Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1359 (2002).
8. See, e.g., Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002) (Peru and Ecuador);
Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., 273 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2001) (India); Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co.,
239 F.3d 440 (2d Cir. 2000) (Egypt); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d
Cir. 2000) (Nigeria); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999)
(Indonesia); Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, 51 F.3d 1411 (9th Cir. 1995); Carmichael v.
United Techs. Corp., 835 F.2d 109 (5th Cir. 1988) (Saudi Arabia); Mujica v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (Colombia); Bowoto v. Chevron
Texaco Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (Nigeria); Villeda v. Fresh Del Monte
Produce, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 2d 1285 (S.D. Fla. 2003), affd, 416 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2005)
(Guatemala); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2003)
(Colombia); Rodriquez v. Drummond Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1250 (N.D. Ala. 2003)
(Colombia); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Sudan); Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 8118, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17436 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2002), vacated, 77 F. App'x 48 (2d Cir. 2003) (Nigeria);
Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 253 F. Supp. 2d 1510 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff'd, 343 F.3d 140
(2d Cir. 2003) (Peru); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (Papua
New Guinea); In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litigation I, 164 F. Supp. 2d
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In an opinion authored by Justice Souter, the Court
unanimously rejected Alvarez's claim that his arrest and overnight
detention by Mexican nationals acting at the request of the U.S.
Drug Enforcement Administration was a tort in violation of the
law of nations within the purview of the ATCA. As such, the
Court dismissed his ATCA claim against his captors.9 The Court
refused to adopt Sosa's contention that the ATCA was merely
jurisdictional and inoperative without congressional adoption of
claims for relief actionable pursuant to the statute."0 Rather, the
Court inferred that Congress intended that the ATCA provide
jurisdiction for "a relatively modest set of actions alleging
violations of the law of nations."" The basis for these actions was
provided by the common law. 2 The Court found no basis to find
that Congress intended the ATCA to reach beyond three torts
actionable in the late eighteenth century, specifically, violation of
safe conduct, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and
piracy. 3 However, Justice Souter nevertheless concluded that
modern federal courts could recognize additional torts based on
the law of nations as long as they rested on "a norm of
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined
with a specificity comparable to the features of [these] 18th-
century paradigms."'" The door to "further independent judicial
recognition of actionable international norms" was thus "still ajar
subject to vigilant doorkeeping.'" This "vigilant doorkeeping"
required federal courts to refuse to recognize private claims under
federal common law for violations of international law norms that
were not "specific, universal and obligatory."'"
Although it did not address the issue of the liability of
transnational corporations for human rights abuses pursuant to the
1160 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (various locations throughout Asia); In re World War II Era
Japanese Forced Labor Litigation II, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1154 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (various
locations throughout Asia); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000)
(Burma); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999) (Germany);
Eastman Kodak v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (Bolivia); Doe v. Unocal
Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (Burma).
9. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 742 (2004).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 746.
12. Id. at 742.
13. Id. at 743.
14. Id. at 749.
15. Id. at 752.
16. Id. at 753.
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ATCA, the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion is crucial to the
determination of such liability in pending and future cases.'7 This
Article examines the implications of the U.S. Supreme Court's
opinion in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain for presently pending and
future ATCA cases alleging violations of human rights involving
the personal welfare of individuals. The Article commences with
an overview of the ATCA itself and a summary of current ATCA
litigation involving personal welfare rights. The Article then
provides detailed discussion of the opinion in Alvarez-Machain.
The opinion is then analyzed in the context of claims relating to
personal welfare rights in presently pending and future ATCA
litigation. The Article concludes that most claims involving
personal welfare rights will not survive application of the Alvarez-
Machain opinion by the lower federal courts.
II. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO SOSA V. ALVAREZ-
MACHAIN
A. The Alien Tort Claims Act
Although a comprehensive history of the ATCA is beyond
the scope of this Article, a brief review of its historical background
is necessary to place the Supreme Court's opinion in Sosa in
proper perspective. Judicial interpretation of the ATCA has been
complicated by the complete absence of legislative history as well
as judicial elaboration in opinions prior to the 1980s. The ATCA is
not mentioned in the debates surrounding the adoption of the first
Judiciary Act, and there is no evidence of what its drafters
intended by its inclusion." This lack of formal legislative history
has served as a significant source of frustration for courts called
upon to interpret its provisions in a contemporary context. 19 As a
17. It has been noted that [e]very other Alien Tort Claims Act litigation forever is
going to be referring to the analysis in this case." Stacey Harms & Samira Puskar, The
Court Opens the Door to International Human Rights Cases, MEDILL NEWS SERV. (June
2004) (quoting Paul Hoffman, lead counsel for Alvarez-Machain).
18. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 782-833 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789); see also Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (wherein
Judge Bork noted "[t]he debates over the Judiciary Act in the House - the Senate debates
were not recorded - nowhere mention the provision, not even, so far as we are aware,
indirectly.").
19. See, e.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 104 n.10 (2d Cir. 2000)
("The original purpose of the ATCA remains the subject of some controversy .... [as]
[t]he Act has no formal legislative history" and that the intent of the drafters was "a
matter forever hidden from our view by the scarcity of relevant evidence."); Trajano v.
2006]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
result, the oft-quoted characterization of the ATCA as "a kind of
legal Lohengrin" which, despite its ancient standing, "no one
seems to know whence it came," remained relevant to modern
courts confronted with ATCA cases. °
The absence of formal legislative history led to considerable
speculation as to what may have been the First Congress'
legislative intent. Judicial speculation included the suggestion the
ATCA was intended to ensure a federal forum for claims asserted
by aliens against U.S. citizens or arising from events occurring in
the United States.2' According to this interpretation, the ATCA
was necessary in order to prevent state courts from mishandling
such cases and resultant-embarrassment to the United States.
Courts also attempted to delineate the specific torts intended by
the First Congress to fall within the parameters of the ATCA. 3
More recently, one member of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit speculated the ATCA was adopted to ensure
supremacy of the federal government's interpretation of
international law over those proffered by the states and to further
Congress' intent that "the new nation take its place among the
civilized nations of the world."
2
1
Commentators also widely speculated on this subject. Some
commentators contended that the ATCA's original intent was
related to national security and sovereignty considerations. These
commentators concluded that the ATCA was intended to shield
the United States from foreign threats resulting from erroneous
interpretations of international law by the states,29 protect the
physical integrity of foreign ambassadors serving in the United
Marcos, 978 F.2d 493, 498 (9th Cir. 1992) ("The debates that led to the Act's passage
contain no reference to the Alien Tort Statute, and there is no direct evidence of what the
First Congress intended to accomplish."); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman
Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("Despite the fact that the ATCA
has existed for over two hundred years, little is known of the framers' intentions in
adopting it - the legislative history of the Judiciary Act does not refer to Section 1350.").
20. IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975).
21. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 782-83 (Edwards, J., concurring).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 813 (Bork, J., concurring) (listing violations of safe conduct, infringement on
the rights of ambassadors and piracy as the torts intended by the First Congress to be
within the scope of the ATCA).
24. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 649 (9th Cir. 2003) (O'Scannlain,
J., dissenting).
25. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rabkin, Universal Justice: The Role of Federal Courts in




2162States, prevent piracy,27 and serve as a "badge of honor" signifying
the arrival of the United States in the community of nations.28
Other commentators focused upon economic realities confronting
the United States at the time of the adoption of the ATCA.
According to these commentators, the ATCA was intended to
bolster the economy by encouraging immigration and foreign
investment through the assurance the United States would conduct
itself in accordance with the law of nations. 9 Interpretations also
varied with respect to the breadth of the problems sought to be
addressed by the ATCA. For example, one commentator
speculated the ATCA was drafted to address a single problem,
specifically, the punishment of torts committed by crews of U.S.
vessels in the course of stopping and boarding ships suspected of
aiding enemies in times of war. ° By contrast, other commentators
concluded the ATCA was intended from its inception to address
26. See, e.g., William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A
Response to the "Originalists," 19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 221, 232-33 (1996);
Rabkin, supra note 25, at 2125-26; Shaw, supra note 7, at 1364. This school of
interpretation is based upon two incidents in early U.S. history. The first incident involved
an assault by Chevalier De Longchamps, a French citizen, upon the French Consul
General Marbois in Philadelphia in 1784. See Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1
Dall.) 111 (1784). The second incident involved a forcible entry into the home of the
Dutch Ambassador Van Berckel by a New York City constable for the purpose of
effectuating an arrest of a servant. See Report of John Jay, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, on
Complaint of Minister of the United Netherlands, 34 J. CONT. CONG. 109, 111 (1788).
Although both perpetrators were ultimately convicted of violating the law of nations, such
convictions were procured in state courts due to the absence of a federal statutory remedy.
See Letter from Edmund Randolph, Governor of Virginia, to the Speaker of the House of
Delegates (Oct. 10, 1787) (stating that "if the rights of an ambassador be invaded by any
citizen it is only in a few States that any laws exist to punish the offender"), quoted in
Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 149 n.13 (2d Cir. 2003).
27. See, e.g., Michael D. Pettyjohn, Comment, "Bring Me Your Tired, Your Poor,
Your Egregious Torts Yearning to See Green:" The Alien Tort Statute, 10 TULSA J. COMP.
& INT'L L. 513, 515 (2003); Peter Waldman & Timothy Mapes, A Global Journal Report:
Administration Sets New Hurdles for Human-Rights Cases, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2002, at
B1.
28. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789:
A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 461 (1989); Shaw, supra note 7, at 1364.
29. See, e.g., Rabkin, supra note 25, at 2125; Pettyjohn, supra note 27, at 515; Shaw,
supra note 7, at 1364. This conclusion is based, in part, upon James Madison's statement to
the Virginia Convention that "[w]e well know, sir, that foreigners cannot get justice done
them in these [state] courts, and this has prevented many wealthy gentlemen from trading
or residing among us." 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 583 (1888), quoted in Tel-Oren v. Libyan
Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 783 n.12 (1984) (Edwards, J., concurring).
30. See Joseph M. Sweeney, A Tort Only in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 445,445 (1995).
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public and private human rights abuses in violation of the law of
nations.'
Equally missing as a source of modern interpretation was an
established body of judicial Drecedent. The ATCA was an
infrequent subject of judicial opinions prior to the 1980s. The first
recorded judicial reference occurred in 1795 when a federal court
in South Carolina concluded the ATCA granted jurisdiction with
respect to a dispute concerning title to slaves seized on a captured
enemy vessel . Subsequent reference did not occur until 1908
when the U.S. Supreme Court suggested in passing the ATCA
may be applicable to a claim that a U.S. officer illegally seized
alien property in a foreign state 3 The third judicial reference came
in 1961 in Adra v. Clift.' In this child custody case between two
aliens, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland held
wrongful withholding of custody constituted an actionable tort and
the misuse of a passport to gain the child's entry into the United
States was a violation of international law."6 The final significant
reference to the ATCA prior to its reemergence in the 1980s was
in the opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger.3 6 This case arose from the alleged
illegal evacuation of children from Vietnam by the U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service. In dicta, the court noted
injuries accruing as a result of the evacuation could be addressed
pursuant to the ATCA 7 The court also noted participating private
adoption agencies could be deemed joint tortfeasors. 38 In addition
to these judicial opinions, the ATCA has been the subject of two
opinions of the U.S. Attorney General dating from 1795 and 1907
31. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Human Rights Responsibilities of Private Corporations,
35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 801, 816-17 (2002). Professor Paust based this conclusion
upon remarks made by President Thomas Jefferson during his Sixth Annual Message to
Congress in 1806 wherein the President recognized a private duty to refrain from engaging
in the slave trade based upon human rights considerations. See id. at 816 (citing United
States v. Haun, 26 F. Cas. 227 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1860) (No. 15,329)). Professor Paust's
interpretation is additionally based upon similar statements made by John Quincy Adams
in oral arguments before the U.S. Supreme Court in The Schooner Amistad case. See The
Amistad, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 518 (1841).
32. See Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (C.C.D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607).
33. See O'Reilly de Camara v. Brooke, 209 U.S. 45, 51 (1908).
34. Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961).
35. Id. at 863-64.
36. Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194 (9th Cir. 1975).
37. Id. at 1201-02 n.13.
38. Id. at 1201 n.13.
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respectively.39 However, other sources of interpretation were
absent prior to the watershed opinions of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in Filartiga v. Peha-Irala° and
Kadic v. Karadzic.4'
B. A TCA Personal Welfare Jurisprudence and Transnational
Corporations
Personal welfare human right claims have been advanced in
nine cases.4" Three opinions have concluded the defendants'
39. See 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 250, 253 (1907) (wherein the attorney general concluded
the ATCA "provides a forum and a right of action" to Mexican nationals injured as a
result of the diversion of the Rio Grande by a U.S. irrigation company if such act was
deemed to be a tort in violation of the law of nations); see also 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 59
(1795) (wherein the attorney general concluded the ATCA provided a remedy for aliens
injured as a result of the participation of U.S. citizens in the plundering of British property
off the coast of Sierra Leone by French naval forces in violation of principles of
neutrality).
40. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that torture perpetrated by a Paraguayan
police official upon a private citizen of Paraguay violated the law of nations and was
actionable by the victim's survivors pursuant to the ATCA).
41. 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding offenses of universal concern such as genocide,
war crimes, torture and summary execution perpetrated by a private individual against
other private individuals violates the law of nations, is actionable pursuant to the ATCA
and does not present nonjusticiable issues pursuant to the political question and act of
state doctrines).
42. See Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440, 448 (2d Cir. 2000) (claim that Coca-Cola
Company unlawfully occupied a factory located on the plaintiffs' property in Helipolis,
Egypt, which was confiscated in 1962 by the government of President Gamal Abdel-
Nasser because the plaintiffs were Jewish); see also Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,
226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000) (claims by political activists alleging imprisonment, torture and
execution by the Nigerian government at the instigation of Royal Dutch Petroleum
Company, Shell Transport and Trading Company and their wholly owned subsidiary Shell
Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria in response to opposition to oil exploration
activities); Carmichael v. United Techs. Corp., 835 F.2d 109 (5th Cir. 1988) (claims of
arbitrary detention and torture in Saudi Arabia as a result of the plaintiff's inability to pay
debts accrued by his employer or obtain releases thereof); Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum
Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (claims alleging extrajudicial killing, torture,
crimes against humanity, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and war crimes arising
from aerial bombing of Santo Domingo, Colombia by Occidental Petroleum's private
security contractor); Bowoto v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (N.D. Cal.
2004) (claims by Nigerian villagers alleging that ChevronTexaco, by and through its
subsidiary, ChevronTexaco Overseas Petroleum, Inc., and Chevron Nigeria Limited
collaborated with the Nigerian government in the commission of summary execution,
crimes against humanity, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and violations of
the rights to life, liberty and security occurring during attacks upon villages in the Ogoni
region of Nigeria); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp.
2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (claims by current and former non-Muslim residents of southern
Sudan alleging that Talisman collaborated with the Sudanese government in committing
extrajudicial killings, forcible displacement, war crimes, confiscation and destruction of
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
alleged conduct constituted torts in violation of the law of nations.
Specifically, in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin, the district court
held that liability pursuant to the ATCA reaches conspiracies
between state and private actors "to perpetrate illegal acts through
the coercive use of state power," in this case, arbitrary detention
contrary to legitimate penological interests. Although the
plaintiff's detention was not accompanied by torture, he was
nonetheless detained under conditions "horrendous by any
contemporary standard of human decency" which was a readily
foreseeable result of the defendants' conspiracy with Bolivian
officials." Furthermore, even assuming that arbitrary detention
was required to be prolonged in order to be actionable, the court
found no reason why imprisonment for a period of ten days could
not be considered prolonged. 5
This conclusion was affirmed in Presbyterian Church of Sudan
v. Talisman Energy, Inc., wherein the district court held that
transnational corporations could be liable for conspiracy and
aiding and abetting human rights violations." This conclusion was
based upon opinions interpreting international law precedents
which characterized private party liability for conspiracy and
aiding and abetting as arising from practical assistance,
encouragement, or moral support which has a substantial effect on
the occurrence of the violation and is perpetrated with actual or
constructive knowledge that it will facilitate the alleged
violations. 7 The district court also held slavery and war crimes to
property, kidnapping and rape, stemming from its oil exploration activities in the country);
Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 8118, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17436 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
17, 2002), vacated, 77 F. App'x 48 (2d Cir. 2003) (claims alleging injuries suffered by
children as a result of negligence in the testing of the antibiotic Trovaflozacin Mesylate
(Trovan) in Kano, Nigeria); Abrams v. Societe Nationale des Chemins de Francais, 175 F.
Supp. 2d 423 (E.D.N.Y. 2001), rev'd, 332 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2002), vacated by, Societe
Nationale des Chemins de Francais v. Abrams, 542 U.S. 901 (2004) (claims alleging
complicity of French national railroad company in violations of the law of nations
associated with the deportation of French nationals to Nazi concentration camps in World
War II); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (claim of
arbitrary detention and extortion in Bolivia as a result of a commercial dispute).
43. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. at 1091 ("It would be a strange tort system that imposed
liability on state actors but not on those who conspire with them.").
44. Id. at 1094.
45. Id.
46. Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 320-24.




be actionable pursuant to the ATCA." Finally, private parties
could be liable for displacement of civilian populations, the
uncompensated confiscation of property, torture, and persecution
of ethnic and religious minorities to the extent that these violations
occurred in the course of commission of genocide and war crimes."
Most recently, in Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., the
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California held that
claims alleging extrajudicial killing, torture, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes were actionable pursuant to the
ATCA." The claims of extrajudicial killing and torture were
recognizable international norms as a result of their inclusion
within the prohibitions set forth in the Torture Victim Protection
Act ("TVPA").5' The claim alleging crimes against humanity was
cognizable based upon their recognition by the Nuremberg
Charter and the international criminal tribunals arising from
events in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 2 War crimes also
were actionable as a result of their criminalization in the Geneva
Conventions and U.S. law.5" However, cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment was not actionable pursuant to the ATCA as
its recognition would "allow foreign plaintiffs to litigate claims in
U.S. courts that bear a strong resemblance to intentional infliction
of emotional distress.""4 Such a result would result in "broad
swaths of conduct" serving as the basis for ATCA claims.5
The majority of opinions have rejected claims that torts
allegedly committed by transnational corporations are within the
law of nations as to be actionable pursuant to the ATCA. For
example, in Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., the Second Circuit concluded
"[h]owever reprehensible, neither racial or religious discrimination
in general nor the discriminatory expropriation of property in
particular is . . . an act of universal concern . . . or sufficiently
similar to [such] acts" absent commission by state officials or a
48. Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 326-27.
49. Id. at 324-28.
50. Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1178-81 (C.D. Cal.
2005).
51. Id. at 1178-79. The TVPA provides civil liability for "an individual who, under
actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation subjects an individual
to torture... or extrajudicial killing." 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
52. See Mujica, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 1180.
53. See id. at 1181.
54. Id. at 1183.
55. Id.
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private party acting under color of state law.6 The plaintiffs failed
to demonstrate that Coca-Cola was complicit in the confiscation of
their property by the Egyptian government.57
A similar conclusion was reached by the Fifth Circuit in
Carmichael v. United Technologies Corp.58 The court affirmed the
district court's dismissal of the complaint on the basis that,
although the ATCA confers jurisdiction over private parties who
"conspire in, or aid and abet, official acts of torture by one nation
against the citizens of another nation," the plaintiff failed to
demonstrate the defendants were involved in or aware of his
arrest, incarceration and mistreatment. 9 Absent such evidence, the
Fifth Circuit concluded the plaintiff failed to demonstrate any
causal connection between the defendants' conduct and his
imprisonment and torture.60
The same conclusion was also reached by the district court in
Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc.6' The court held private actors violate
international law when their misconduct "is either listed as an act
'of universal concern' in [section] 404 [of the Restatement of the
Law of Foreign Relations] or is sufficiently similar to the listed acts
for us to treat them as though they were incorporated into
[section] 404 by analogy., 62 Pfizer's drug testing procedures,
however reprehensible, did not rise to the level of a violation of
universal concern.6' Nevertheless, the court found that Pfizer was a
state actor as the actions of the Nigerian government in approving
the testing procedures, assigning physicians to assist in the process
and fraudulently altering documents and silencing critics rendered
the government and Pfizer joint participants in the Trovan testing
protocol.'
56. Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440, 448 (2d Cir. 2000).
57. Id. at 449.
58. Carmichael v. United Techs. Corp., 835 F.2d 109 (5th Cir. 1988).
59. Id at 113-14 (5th Cir. 1988).
60. Id. at 115.
61. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 8118, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17436 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 17, 2002).
62. Id. at *14 (citing Bigio, 239 F.3d at 448); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF U.S. § 404 (1987) (listing piracy, participation in the slave
trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes and acts of terrorism as
international law violations of "universal concern").
63. Abdullahi, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17436, at *14.
64. Id. at *17-18. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit did not address
the issue of what torts are within the law of nations in order to be actionable in its decision
vacating the district court's opinion. See Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 77 Fed. App'x 48, 53 (2d
Cir. 2003).
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Closely related to the above-referenced cases are claims
alleging harm to the personal welfare of individuals as a result of
violation of environmental standards.69 The federal courts have
largely rejected ATCA claims arising from alleged harm to
personal welfare as a result of violations of international
environmental standards. For example, in Beanal v. Freeport-
McMoran, Inc., the Fifth Circuit dismissed the plaintiff's
environmental tort claim due to the absence of specific names,
dates, locations, times, and facts that would place the defendants
on notice of their factual basis. 6 The court further held the
defendants' alleged violation of the Rio Declaration on the
Environment and Development did not rise to the level of
"shockingly egregious violations of universally recognized
principles of international law."67 Rather, the Rio Declaration
merely stated "a general sense of environmental responsibility...
abstract rights and liberties devoid of articulable or discernable
standards."'
Similar reasoning also supported the dismissal of the
plaintiff's cultural genocide claim. The international conventions
cited by the plaintiff in support of his claim of a right to cultural
development were "amorphous" and failed to "proscribe or
identify conduct that would constitute cultural genocide."6 9 These
65. See Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002) (claims by 55,000
Ecuadorians and Peruvians alleging environmental degradation of rain forests occurring as
a result of Texaco, Inc.'s oil production operations); see also Bano v. Union Carbide Corp.,
273 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2001) (claims of environmental degradation and ensuing physical
injuries resulting from release of methyl isocyanate from pesticide plant in Bhopal, India
in December 1984); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999)
(claims of environmental degradation and genocide by the leader of the Lambaga Adat
Suki Amungme tribe arising from the operation of an open pit copper, gold and silver
mine by Freeport-McMoran, Inc. and Freeport-McMoran Copper & Gold, Inc. in the
Indonesian province of Irian Jaya); Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 253 F. Supp. 2d 510
(S.D.N.Y. 2002), (claims of violations of the rights to life, health and sustainable
development arising from the operation of a copper mine and refinery by Southern Peru
Copper Corporation in Ilo, Peru), aftd, 414 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2003); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 221
F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (claims of war crimes, genocide, racial discrimination,
environmental degradation, and violations of the rights to life, health and sustainable
development arising from the operation of a gold and copper mine by Rio Tinto on the
island of Bougainville in Papua New Guinea).
66. Beanal, 197 F.3d at 165.
67. Id. at 167.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 168, n.7. (citing International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A.
Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 27, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec.
16, 1966) (providing ethnic minorities "shall not be denied the right.., to enjoy their own
culture"); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
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"vague and declaratory international documents" also presented
application problems as they were "devoid of discernible means to
define and identify conduct that constitutes a violation of
international law."7 Finally, the court held the plaintiff failed to
demonstrate that cultural genocide had achieved "universal
acceptance as a discrete violation of international law."7' This
conclusion was especially warranted by the express refusal of the
drafters of the Genocide Convention to include cultural genocide
within its prohibitions.7'
Federal courts have also dismissed environmental tort claims
based upon the rights to life, health, and sustainable development.
In Sarei v. Rio Tinto, the district court rejected these claims on the
bases that such rights lacked sufficient specificity, were not
universally recognized and did not have generally accepted
meanings in the international community.73 Furthermore, a holding
that the mining operation violated the rights to life and health
would be contrary to international law principles that permit states
to exploit their natural resources in an unfettered fashion as long
as it does not injure other states.74 However, it bears to note the
Court In Surt conuded tia i4 possessed jurisdiction with respect
to the claim that the defendants violated the U.N. Convention on
the Law of the Sea by failing to take necessary measures to
prevent or reduce pollution damaging to human health and marine
life.' Although the United States had not ratified the Convention,
the court held it was still bound to uphold its purposes and
principles." Furthermore, the Convention represented the law of
nations as it had been ratified by 166 states at the time of the
court's opinion.
2200A (XXI), art. 1(1), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (Dec. 16,




72. Id. at 168 n.8.
73. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1158-60 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
74. Id. at 1159 (citing Beanal, 197 F.3d at 167 n.6; Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp.,
7745 F. Supp. 668, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)).
75. Id. at 1161-62 (citing United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10,
1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261).
76. Id. (citing Mayaguezanos por ]a Salud y el Ambiente v. United States, 38 F. Supp.




The U.S. Court of Appeals and District Court for the
Southern District of New York utilized similar reasoning in
rejecting claims of violation of the rights to life, health and
sustainable development. In Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp.,
the district court noted that, although severe environmental
pollution necessarily has an impact on human life, the plaintiffs
failed to demonstrate that such pollution and resultant injury
violated well-established rules of customary international law.78
The human health impact of pollution was of growing
international concern, but there was no "general consensus among
nations that a high level of pollution, causing harm to humans, is
universally unacceptable. 7 9 International instruments cited by the
plaintiffs in support of their claims elucidated rights but did not
identify concomitant prohibitions.' This absence rendered the
principles they represented insufficiently determinate for purposes
of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the ATCA.8" The
plaintiffs' efforts to render these principles actionable through the
utilization of multiple affidavits and opinions of professors were
equally unconvincing.' To the contrary, customary international
law provides that the appropriate balance between economic
development and environmental protection lies within the sound
discretion of each state with respect to land within its borders.8 In
addition, international law is not violated by pollution occurring
exclusively within a state's borders.'
The Second Circuit agreed with the district court's
conclusions on appeal. 85 In order to qualify as customary
international law for purposes of the ATCA, the Second Circuit
held the principle must have universal acceptance by states that
accede out of a sense of legal obligation and must be of mutual
78. Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 253 F. Supp. 2d 510, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
79. Id.
80. See id. at 519-20, n.14.
81. Id. at 525.
82. Id. at 521 n.17.
83. Id. at 521-22 (citing U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de
Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, princ.
2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Aug. 12, 1992) ("States have ... the sovereign right to
exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental
policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control
do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction.")).
84. Id. at 522 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF U.S.
§ 601 (1987)).
85. Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2003).
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concern involving their relations with one another. 6 Furthermore,
these principles must be ascertainable by "concrete evidence of the
customs and practices of States." 7 Treaties, conventions and other
international instruments that fail to set forth specific rules that
cannot be readily discerned or applied in a "rigorous, systematic or
legal manner" do not constitute customary international law
principles enforceable pursuant to the ATCA.'
The purported customary international law basis for the
plaintiffs' claims failed to meet these standards. The Second
Circuit concluded the rights to life and health alleged by the
plaintiffs were "vague and amorphous" and could not support an
ATCA claim.89 The international instruments cited by the plaintiffs
in support on these claims, specifically, the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights and the Rio Declaration on the Environment
and Development, expressed "virtuous goals" but were otherwise
"boundless and indeterminate."9 These instruments proclaimed
"only nebulous notions that are infinitely malleable" rather than
"clear, definite and unambiguous" principles upon which an
r-i i C- laUu liay UC ud_u.
The same reasoning was applicable to the plaintiffs' claim
with respect to intra-national pollution. The plaintiffs sought to
establish a prohibition upon such pollution as a principle of
customary international law. However, the treaties and
conventions relied upon by the plaintiffs failed to contain a specific
prohibition upon intra-national pollution, had not been ratified by
the United States, or were vague and aspirational. "2 For example,
although ratified by 148 states, the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights did not contain a specific prohibition upon
intra-national pollution and was non-self executing in the United
States.93 The American Convention on Human Rights also failed to
specifically prohibit such pollution, had not been ratified by the
United States and was not "universally embraced by all of the
86. Id. at 154-55.
87. Id. at 156.
88. See id. at 158.
89. See id. at 160.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 161.
92. See id. at 163-65.
93. Id. at 163-64.
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prominent States within the region in which it purports to apply. 94
The same conclusion held true for the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.9 Although Article 24 of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child expressly addresses
environmental pollution, it does not establish prohibitions upon or
parameters for such pollution and has not been ratified by the
United States.96 Plaintiffs' reliance upon United Nations General
Assembly resolutions and other multinational declarations of
principles also failed as bases for ATCA claims due to their
aspirational nature and failure to create binding and definable
standards for state conduct.97 Decisions of the International Court
of Justice also could not serve as a source of customary
international law as its decisions lack binding effect except
between the parties and in respect of the particular case."
Customary international law principles also could not be derived
from decisions of the European Court of Human Rights as it was
only empowered to "interpret and apply" the rules set forth in the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms.'
94. Id. at 164.
95. See id.
96. Id. at 165. Article 24 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child provides, in
part, that states "take appropriate measures ... to combat disease and malnutrition...
through ... the provision of adequate nutritious foods and clean drinking water, taking
into consideration the dangers and risks of environmental pollution." Convention on the
Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, art. 24, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 489, U.N.
Doc. A/44/25 (Nov. 20, 1989).
97. Flores, 343 F.3d at 165-69. These declarations included the Universal
Declaration, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and the Rio
Declaration on the Environment and Development. See Rio Declaration on the
Environment and Development, supra note 83, princ. 1 (environmental protection and
sustainable development); see also American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of
Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX (1948), reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82, doc. 6, rev. 1, at 17
(1992); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, arts. 3, 25(1), U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) (right to life and right to
health).
98. Flores, 343 F.3d at 169 (citing Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 59,
June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055).
99. Id. at 170 (citing European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 32, Europ. T.S. No. 5,213 U.N.T.S. 211 (1968)).
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III. THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF SOSA V. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN
A. The Factual Background to Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
The factual background to Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain is well
known due to the U.S. Supreme Court's previous opinion."
Nevertheless, a brief description of the relevant facts is warranted
in order to place the U.S. Supreme Court's most recent opinion in
context."' The plaintiff Humberto Alvarez-Machain ("Alvarez") is
a citizen of Mexico.'2 Alvarez was indicted by a federal grand jury
in Los Angeles, California, in 1990 for alleged complicity in the
kidnapping, torture, and murder of U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration ("DEA") agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar
("Camarena") and his Mexican pilot Alfredo Zavala-Avelar in
Guadalajara, Mexico, in February 1985.'°3 The U.S. District Court
for the Central District of California issued a warrant for Alvarez's
arrest after his indictment) °n
Although the United States negotiated with Mexican officials
to obtain custody of Alvarez, no formal request for extradition was
made.0 5 Rather, DEA officials approved a plan to use Mexican
nationals not affiliated with the governments of the United States
or Mexico to arrest Alvarez in Mexico and bring him to the United
States for trial.' 6 Specifically, Hector Berellez, the DEA agent in
charge of the Camarena murder investigation, retained Antonio
Garate-Bustamante ("Garate"), a Mexican citizen and DEA
operative, to contact Mexican nationals willing to participate in the
arrest.0 7 Through operatives, Garate retained Jose Francisco Sosa,
100. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (holding Alvarez's
forcible abduction from Mexico at the behest of agents employed by the U.S. Drug
Enforcement Administration did not violate the United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty
of 1978 as to bar his prosecution for alleged complicity in the torture and murder of Drug
Enforcement Administration special agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar).
101. The following statement of facts is derived from the opinion of Circuit Judge M.
Margaret McKeown of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Alvarez-
Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604 (9th Cir. 2003).
102. Id. at 609.
103. Id. Alvarez was charged with conspiracy to commit violent acts in furtherance of
racketeering activity (18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1959 (2000)); committing violent acts in
furtherance of racketeering activity (18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(2)); conspiracy to kidnap a
federal agent (18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(5)); kidnapping of a federal agent (18 U.S.C. §
1201(a)(5)); and felony murder of a federal agent (18 U.S.C. §§ 1111(a), 1114).






a former Mexican police officer, to participate in Alvarez's
arrest."°8 This operation occurred on April 2, 1990, when Sosa and
others abducted Alvarez from his office in Guadalajara, held him
overnight in a motel in Mexico, and subsequently transported him
to El Paso, Texas where he was arrested by U.S. federal agents.0 9
Alvarez was arraigned and transported to Los Angeles, California
for trial. He remained in federal custody from April 1990 until
December 1992.1
Alvarez moved to dismiss the indictment on the basis that the
federal court lacked jurisdiction because his arrest was in violation
of the extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico. "'
While rejecting the claim that the government engaged in
outrageous conduct, the district court nevertheless held it lacked
jurisdiction to try Alvarez as his abduction violated the U.S.-
Mexico Extradition Treaty."2 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the indictment and ordered
Alvarez's repatriation. "3 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed these
opinions and remanded the case for trial,"' holding Alvarez's
forcible abduction did not violate the Extradition Treaty.
Furthermore, federal courts retain the power to try persons for
crimes even when their presence has been forcibly procured."5 The
Court did note, however, that Alvarez's abduction "may be in
violation of general international law principles," thereby
permitting him to pursue civil remedies at a later date."6
108. It was alleged Sosa was promised a recommendation for employment with the
Mexican Attorney-General's office if the arrest operation was successful. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.; see also Extradition Treaty, U.S.-Mex., May 4, 1978, 31 U.S.T. 5059.
112. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
113. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991). The Ninth
Circuit relied upon its previous holding in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d
1341 (9th Cir. 1991). In that case, the court held the forcible abduction of a Mexican
national (also indicted for participation in Camarena's murder) with the authorization and
participation of the United States was a violation of the U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty.
Id. at 1350. Although the treaty did not expressly prohibit forcible abduction, the court
held such conduct violated the "purpose" of the treaty. This violation gave the offended
nation the right to file a formal protest as well as the defendant the right to contest the
district court's jurisdiction. Id. at 1352-58. The remedy for such a violation was dismissal of
the indictment and repatriation of the defendant to Mexico. Id. at 1355-58.
114. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 656 (1992).
115. Id. at 670 (citing Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886)).
116. Id. at 669.
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Alvarez was tried for Camarena's kidnapping, torture, and
murder in 1992. However, after the presentation of the
government's case, the district court judge granted Alvarez's
motion for judgment of acquittal on the ground of insufficient
evidence to support a guilty verdict. The district court specifically
concluded the government's case was based on "suspicion and...
hunches but... no proof," and the theory of the prosecution's case
was "whole cloth, the wildest speculation."" As a result, Alvarez
was repatriated to Mexico.
In 1993, Alvarez initiated a civil action in the United States
District Court for the Central District of California alleging
numerous constitutional and tort claims arising from his abduction,
detention and trial. 18 Sosa, Garate, five unnamed Mexican
nationals, the United States and four DEA agents were listed as
defendants.'19 The district court substituted the United States for
the DEA agents, except Sosa and Garate, on all non-constitutional
claims.' The United States was substituted for Garate by later
stipulation of the parties. 2' Sosa's interlocutory appeal of the
district court's substitution order was subsequently dismissed by
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for lack of
appellate jurisdiction.'22 The Ninth Circuit also affirmed the district
court's dismissal of the constitutional claims arising from Alvarez's
kidnapping and detention in Mexico and its denial of the defenses
based on qualified immunity and the statute of limitations with
respect to claims asserted pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims
Act.2  However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's
dismissal of Alvarez's claim asserted pursuant to the TVPA. 4
117. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604,610 (9th Cir. 2003).
118. Alvarez's complaint, as amended, alleged claims sounding in: (1) kidnapping; (2)
torture; (3) cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment; (4) arbitrary
detention; (5) assault and battery; (6) false imprisonment; (7) intentional infliction of
emotional distress; (8) false arrest; (9) negligent employment; (10) negligent infliction of
emotional distress; and (11) violations of the Fourth, Fifth and Eighth Amendments to the
U.S. Constitution relating to these torts. Id. at 610 n.1.
119. Id. at 610.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 700 n.2 (9th Cir. 1997).
123. Id. at 703-04.
124. Id. at 704.
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B. The District Court Opinion
The district court was confronted with numerous motions for
summary judgment on remand from the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals.'5 The district court's holding with respect to Alvarez's
claim pursuant to the ATCA is of particular relevance. The district
court's holding on the ATCA affected three causes of action
dependent upon international norms: kidnapping; cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment; and prolonged arbitrary detention. With
respect to Alvarez's claim of kidnapping, Sosa contended the
Ninth Circuit precedent rejected kidnapping as an action in
violation of international law.'26 Sosa further contended there was
an absence of universal consensus with respect to whether
kidnapping violates international norms. 127 Sosa also alleged
Alvarez lacked standing to assert a violation of Mexico's territorial
sovereignty that occurred as a result of the kidnapping.'28 Finally,
Sosa contended the U.S. Supreme Court's previous holding that
Alvarez's abduction did not violate the U.S.-Mexico Extradition
Treaty rendered the kidnapping lawful pursuant to international
law.129
The district court rejected these contentions and granted
Alvarez's motion for summary judgment with respect to his claim
of kidnapping. Initially, the court concluded, although the Ninth
Circuit's opinion in United States v. Matta-Ballesteros declined to
grant jus cogens status to kidnapping, it did not decide whether
kidnapping violated customary international law or was actionable
pursuant to the ATCA.'3° Jus cogens status is not necessary in
order to render a breach of customary international norms
125. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23304 (C.D. Cal. Mar.
18, 1999). The district court denied Sosa's motion to substitute the United States, granted
the motion of the four DEA agents and Garate for summary judgment, granted in part
and denied in part the United States' motion for summary judgment, granted in part and
denied in part Sosa's motion for summary judgment and granted in part and denied in part
Alvarez's motion for summary judgment.
126. Id. at *59-60 (citing United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754, 764 n.5 (9th
Cir. 1995) (noting the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that "kidnapping..
. does not qualify as ajus cogens norm, such that its commission would be justiciable in our
courts even absent domestic law").
127. Id. at *60 (noting the numerous international abductions that have occurred since
1835 and the absence of an explicit prohibition in international agreements).
128. Id. at *62.
129. Id. at *62-64.
130. Id. at *60.
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actionable."' Rather, the ATCA only requires the international
norm be "specific, universal and obligatory.' 32
This conclusion was also sufficient to defeat Sosa's claim that
Alvarez was improperly raising territorial sovereignty claims
properly belonging to Mexico." Instead, Alvarez was simply
asserting a cause of action bestowed upon him by the express
language of the ATCA. '"' Furthermore, the occurrence of
international abductions did not inevitably lead to the conclusion
that such actions did not violate international law."' In fact, the
opposite conclusion had been reached in the majority of scholarly
analyses of the topic.'36 Finally, the district court noted the U.S.
Supreme Court's previous opinion in United States v. Alvarez-
Machain only concluded that the abduction did not violate the
U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty and did not conclude such
abduction was consistent with customary norms of international
law. 7 As a result, the district court concluded "'specific, universal
and obligatory' norms of international law prohibit state-
sponsored transborder abductions.'' Although these norms did
not rise to the level of jus cogens, they were nevertheless
"sufficiently established and articulated to support a cause of
action under the [ATCA].''
The court also accepted Alvarez's claim that the defendants'
conduct constituted prolonged arbitrary detention in violation of
the ATCA.l' ° The relatively short period of Alvarez's detention
was not relevant to this determination.' Rather, the court deemed
Sosa's detention arbitrary due to the absence of lawful authority
for the arrest from Mexican authorities.' 2 This detention remained
arbitrary until such time as Alvarez entered U.S. custody.'3 As
such, the court granted summary judgment on Alvarez's claim of
131. Id. at *62.
132. Id. at *61.
133. Id. at *62.
134. Id.
135. Id. at *61.
136. Id.
137. Id. at *63-64.
138. Id. at *64.
139. Id. at *64-65.
140. Id. at *69-70 (citing Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373 (9th Cir.
1998); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987)).
141. Id. at *71.
142. Id. at *71 n.36.
143. Id. at *72 n.37.
[Vol. 28:393
2006] Lohengrin Revealed 415
prolonged arbitrary detention from the time of his arrest in
Mexico to the time of his entry into the United States.1" The
district court entered judgment against Sosa in the amount of
$25,000 for his actions constituting kidnapping and prolonged
arbitrary detention."'
However, the court was not sympathetic to Alvarez's claims
of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. The court agreed with
Sosa's contention that there was no "universal consensus regarding
the content of the tort [of cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment] at the time of the events in this case...... Although
international law prohibited such treatment prior to 1990, events
occurring after Alvarez's detention established the parameters of
such treatment for ATCA purposes.' As such, the court granted
Sosa's motion for summary judgment with respect to Alvarez's
claim of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. 8
C. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' Opinion
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed
Sosa's liability pursuant to the ATCA although on different
grounds than those provided by the district court.'" The Ninth
Circuit first addressed the issue of actionable claims pursuant to
the ATCA. The Ninth Circuit rejected Sosa's contention that only
violations of jus cogens norms, as distinguished from customary
international law, were sufficiently "specific, universal and
obligatory" to be actionable as violations of the law of nations
144. Id.
145. Id. at *78.
146. Id. at *68.
147. The court specifically noted that the U.S. Senate did not ratify the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment until October 1990.
Id. at *68 n.34.
148. The court also based its order on the previous holding of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that no conduct occurred in Mexico which would violate the
Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. See Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107
F.3d 696, 702 (9th Cir. 1997). As a result, Alvarez could not raise a triable issue of fact
with respect to this claim as its viability was dependent upon the existence of conduct
sufficient to violate the U.S. Constitution. See Alvarez-Machain, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23304, at *68.
149. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604 (9th Cir. 2003). On appeal, a
three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed Sosa's liability pursuant to the ATCA and
upheld the district court's award of damages. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 266 F.3d
1045, 1064 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit subsequently agreed to rehear the case en
banc. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 284 F.3d 1039, 1040 (9th Cir. 2002).
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pursuant to the ATCA."5 The court agreed the violation of a jus
cogens norm was sufficient but not necessary to satisfy the
"specific, universal and obligatory" standard.'' The imposition of a
jus cogens requirement in order to state an actionable claim
pursuant to the ATCA would deviate from the history and text of
the ATCA as such norms did not exist at the time of its
enactment. '52 Furthermore, the content of jus cogens norms
remains uncertain and subject to controversy. "3 Thus, the
requirement of such a norm prior to the imposition of liability
pursuant to the ATCA would render the statute inoperative.
The Ninth Circuit then addressed Alvarez's claims with
respect to his transborder abduction. The Ninth Circuit specifically
examined two issues. First, the court rejected Alvarez's claim that
the violation of Mexican sovereignty that occurred during his
arrest was a violation of the law of nations, thereby permitting him
to assert a claim pursuant to the ATCA. The Ninth Circuit agreed
it was indisputable that there was a general norm of international
law prohibiting acts of sovereignty offensive to the territorial
integrity of other states dating back to the earliest decisions of the
U.S. Supreme Court. 1 ' It was further indisputable that law
enforcement authorities of one state could not exercise their
functions in the territory of another state without the latter's
consent. ' However, the court concluded Alvarez did not
150. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 613.
151. Id. at 613 (citing Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2002);
Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1383-84 (9th Cir. 1998); Hilao v. Estate of
Marcos (In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation), 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir.
1994)).
152. Id. at 614. For a history of the development of jus cogens norms, see IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 515 (5th ed. 1998).
153. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 614 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF U.S. § 102 n.6 (1987)). As noted by Professor Brownlie, "more
authority exists for the category of jus cogens than exists for its particular content."
BROWNLIE, supra note 152, at 516-17.
154. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 615 (citing The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362,
371 (1824) (wherein Justice Story stated "it would be monstrous to suppose that our...
officers were authorized to enter into foreign ports and territories, for the purpose of
seizing vessels which had offended against our laws"); The Schooner Exchange v.
McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812) (wherein Chief Justice Marshall recognized
the "exclusive and absolute" nature of territorial jurisdiction)).
155. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF U.S. §
432(2) (1987) ("A state's law enforcement officers may exercise their functions in the
territory of another state only with the consent of the other state, given by duly authorized
officials of that state."); M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED
STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 255 (4th ed. 2002) (recognizing the rule prohibiting law
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demonstrate he was the proper proponent to vindicate Mexico's
national interests. The ATCA creates a remedy for torts in
violation of the law of nations and not a remedy for all violations
of international law."6 The interest protected by the ATCA is
personal to affected individuals and does not concern the separate
rights of aggrieved national governments.' 7 To permit Alvarez to
assert Mexico's rights arising from the violation of its sovereignty
by the DEA would, in the Ninth Circuit's opinion, "lead to the
judiciary's intrusion into matters that are appropriately reserved
for the Executive branch."'58
In addition, the Ninth Circuit refused to recognize
transborder abduction as a violation of customary international
law. The court specifically noted there is no acceptance of such a
norm either in the United States or the international community. 9
Rather, applicable international instruments merely speak to
general prohibitions upon restricting freedom of movement.
16
0
Furthermore, the U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty in force at the
time of the events in question did not prohibit transborder
abduction. The United States and Mexico did not reach an
enforcement officials from one state operating in another state without consent as
"grounded in the notion that international law is designed to protect the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of states by restricting impermissible state conduct"); L. OPPENHEIM,
OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 119, at 387-88 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts
eds., 9th ed. 1992) ("It is... a breach of international law for a state without permission to
send its agents into the territory of another state to apprehend persons accused of having
committed a crime.")).
156. Id. at 616.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 617.
160. See, e.g., American Convention on Human Rights art. 7(1)-(2), O.A.S. T.S. No.
36, OAS Off. Rec. OEA/Ser4v/II 23, doc. 21, rev. 2 (1975) ("[Elvery person has the right
to personal liberty and security" which shall not be denied "except for the reasons and
under the conditions established beforehand by the constitution of the State Party
concerned or by a law established pursuant thereto."); American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man, supra note 97, art. VIII ("Every person has the right to fix his
residence within the territory of the state of which he is a national, to move about freely
within such territory, and not to leave it except by his own will."); International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 69, art. 12 ("[E]veryone lawfully within the
territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and
freedom to choose his residence."); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note
97, art 13(1) ("Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the
borders of each state.").
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agreement prohibiting transborder arrests until 1994. 16 This
agreement had yet to be submitted by the president to the Senate
for ratification and, in any event, expressly prohibits civil lawsuits
arising from its violation. As a result, the court concluded there
was no specific, universal or obligatory norm with respect to
transborder abductions. 16' Rather, this was a case where
"aspiration has not yet ripened into obligation." '163
The second issue addressed by the Ninth Circuit was whether
there existed a specific, universal, and obligatory norm enforceable
pursuant to the ATCA with respect to arbitrary arrest and
detention. In concluding that such a norm existed, the Ninth
Circuit initially noted that prohibitions upon arbitrary arrest and
detention were contained in every major human rights
instrument as well as 119 national constitutions.' The court also
noted that such a conclusion was consistent with previous case law
recognizing an international norm prohibiting detentions not in
accordance with law or incompatible with principles of justice or
human dignity." On the basis that neither applicable case law nor
the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law imported "a separate
temporal requirement for purposes of ATCA liability," the Court
rejected Sosa's contention that Alvarez's detention was
insufficiently prolonged in order to constitute a violation of the
norm."' Applying this standard to the case, the Ninth Circuit
161. See Treaty to Prohibit Transborder Abductions, U.S.-Mex., Nov. 23, 1994,
reprinted in MICHAEL ABBELL, EXTRADITION TO AND FROM THE UNITED STATES, at A-
287, A-303 (2002).
162. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 619-20.
163. Id. at 620.
164. See, e.g., African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights art. 6, June 27, 1981, 21
I.L.M. 58 (1992) (prohibiting arbitrary arrest and detention); American Convention on
Human Rights, supra note 160, art. 7(3) ("[N]o one shall be subject to arbitrary arrest or
imprisonment."); European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 99, art. 5(1) (requiring deprivations of liberty be "in
accordance with a procedure prescribed by law"); International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, supra note 69, art. 9 (obligating states to refrain from "arbitrary arrest or
detention"); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 97, art. 9 ("[N]o one shall
be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile.").
165. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 620 (citing M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in
the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying International Procedural Protections and
Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 235,260-61
(1993)).
166. Id. at 621 (citing Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1384 (9th Cir.
1998); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 789, 795 (9th Cir. 1996)).
167. The court stated that prolonged arbitrary detention may qualify as a jus cogens
norm. Id. at 622 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF U.S. §
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concluded that Alvarez's arrest and detention in Mexico were
arbitrary as they lacked a legal basis."6
The final issue relevant to the ATCA was damages. The court
first addressed the issue of choice of law for damages. Noting this
issue was one of first impression in the circuit, the court began its
inquiry by observing that the forum jurisdiction primarily
determines choice of law." As federal jurisdiction was predicated
on the ATCA, federal common law applied to the choice of law
determination. 7 Pursuant to federal common law, the court
applied the Restatement of Conflict of Laws."' Applying the section
of the Restatement relating to tort claims, the court concluded that
the United States had the most significant relationship to the
occurrence and the parties."' Specifically, the Ninth Circuit held
that the case was "a series of events that began and ended in the
United States, and which are inextricably intertwined with the
United States government. ' '73 U.S. interests were paramount in
this case because the United States was a party, the case arose
702 cmts. a, n (1987)). However, there is no requirement that every arbitrary detention be
prolonged in order to be actionable. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF U.S. § 702 cmt. h (1987) (providing "a single, brief, arbitrary
detention by an official of a state party" may violate international law). Rather, the length
of detention is relevant to the determination of its arbitrariness. Id.
168. Id. at 623. The court specifically refused to give extraterritorial effect to the U.S.
arrest warrant, thereby permitting its enforcement against Alvarez in Mexico. Id. at 623-
31.
169. Id. at 633 (citing Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 228-29
(1996)).
170. Id. (citing Chan v. Soc'y Expeditions, Inc., 123 F.3d 1287, 1297 (9th Cir. 1997)).
171. Id. (citing Bickel v. Korean Air Lines Co., 83 F.3d 127, 130 (6th Cir. 1996);
Schoenberg v. Exportadora de Sal, S.A., 930 F.2d 777, 782 (9th Cir. 1991)).
172. Id. at 634 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 145 (1967)).
Section 145 of the Restatement provides, in part, that the "rights and liabilities of the
parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which,
with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the
parties under the principles stated in § 6." The factors identified in Section 6 are: the needs
of the interstate and international systems; the relevant policies of the forum; the relevant
policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the
determination of the particular issue; the protection of justified expectations; the basic
policies underlying the particular field of law; certainty, predictability and uniformity of
result; and ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied. Id. at 634
n.39.
The court refused to apply Section 146 of the Restatement, which provides for a
presumption in favor of "the local law of the state where the injury occurred." Id. at 634
n.38. The court's refusal was based upon the international character of the tort, which
distinguished it from "a classic personal injury claim," and the absence of physical or
mental injury resulting from physical harm as described in Section 146. Id.
173. Id. at 634.
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from a federal criminal prosecution, and the actions at issue
involved an individual employed as an agent of a federal agency.74
Although Alvarez was arrested in Mexico by Mexican citizens,
U.S. policy of providing a civil remedy for victims of human rights
violations, as expressed in the ATCA, took precedence over
applicable principles of Mexican law.'75 The court also refused to
apply California state law due to the presence of "international
law principles of universal concern" and the ATCA's "unique
place among federal statutory tort causes of action.,
17 6
The Ninth Circuit then addressed the issue of the scope of
damages. Although noting the absence of an established body of
case law with respect to the ATCA, the court nonetheless held
that Sosa could only be liable for those activities that took place
before the United States took Alvarez into custody.'77 This
limitation was based upon two conclusions. First, Sosa's
participation in Alvarez's arrest and detention occurred almost
exclusively within Mexico."8 Second, the delivery of Alvarez to
U.S. law enforcement personnel in Texas broke the chain of
causation set in motion by Sosa's initial act of misconduct.7 9 The
acts of law enforcement personnel in the United States "set in
motion a supervening prosecutorial mechanism which met all of
the procedural requisites of federal due process and ultimately
received the blessing of the United States Supreme Court."' 8 At
that point in time, the U.S. criminal justice system began its
prosecution, thereby breaking the link to Sosa's misconduct in
Mexico. As such, Alvarez was entitled to damages only from his
arrest to the point in time at which he was remanded to the
custody of U.S. authorities.'
174. Id. at 634-35.
175. Id. at 635. For example, the court noted limitations upon damages, including the
unavailability of punitive damages, pursuant to Mexican law were not consistent with U.S.
policy as expressed in the ATCA.
176. Id. (citing Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981);
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 n.25 (1964)).
177. Id. at 636-37.
178. Id.
179. Id. (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484 (1994); Townes v. City of New
York, 176 F.3d 138, 147 (2d Cir. 1999); Barts v. Joyner, 865 F.2d 1187, 1195 (11th Cir.





D. The U.S. Supreme Court Opinion
On June 29, 2004, the Supreme Court unanimously agreed
that Alvarez could not pursue a remedy in federal court pursuant
to the ATCA (i.e., Alien Torts Statute, or "ATS", in the
opinion)."' Justice Souter's majority opinion constituted the first
substantive exposition of the ATCA in its 215-year history.
Despite denying relief to Alvarez, the Court refused to interpret
the ATCA in such a manner as to deny relief to all victims of
human rights abuses."8 3
The Court first addressed Alvarez's contention that the
ATCA is not merely a jurisdictional statute but rather acts as
authority for the creation of a new cause of action for torts in
violation of international law. The Court dismissed this
interpretation as "implausible" given the placement of the ATCA
in the Judiciary Act, "a statute otherwise exclusively concerned
with federal-court jurisdiction."'" This placement meant that the
ATCA was a jurisdictional statute intended to address the power
of federal courts to "entertain cases concerned with a certain
topic. , ,
However, this interpretation did not lead to the conclusion
that the ATCA was stillborn upon its creation due to the absence
of concomitant legislation creating a list of torts actionable
pursuant to the statute. Instead, the Court concluded that federal
courts were entitled to entertain claims upon the adoption of the
jurisdictional grant contained within ATCA, as torts in violation of
the law of nations were recognized in common law existing at the
time.'86 The Court particularly noted that the United States
received the law of nations as it existed upon its independence.'87
This law of nations consisted of "general norms governing the
behavior of national states with each other" and "a body of judge-
made law regulating the conduct of individuals situated outside
domestic boundaries and consequently carrying an international
savor."'" These bodies of law overlapped where violations of the
law of nations gave rise to a judicial remedy, as well as threatened
182. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 697 (2004).
183. See id. at 728-31 (discussing the relevance of international norms intended to
protect individuals on judicial court decisions).
184. Id. at 713.
185. Id. at 714.
186. Id.
187. Id. (citing Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199, 281 (1796)).
188. Id. at 715.
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serious consequences for the United States in the conduct of
international affairs."' This overlap was limited to three offenses,
specifically, violation of safe conduct, infringement of the rights of
ambassadors, and piracy.9 The Court concluded that "this narrow
set of violations ... was probably on the minds of the men who
drafted the [ATCA] with its reference to tort."'91
Justice Souter readily conceded that there was no legislative
record that expressly supported this conclusion.9 ' Nevertheless, the
Court concluded that the ATCA was intended to have practical
effect upon its adoption rather than await future implementing
legislation.'93 The Court specifically noted that the Continental
Congress in 1781 adopted a resolution calling upon state
legislatures to "provide expeditious, exemplary and adequate
punishment" for "the violation of safe conducts or passports ... of
hostility against such as are in amity ... with the United States,...
infractions of the immunities of ambassadors and other public
ministers... [and] infractions of treaties and conventions to which
the United States are a party."'9 4 Furthermore, the First Congress
recognized the importance of the law of nations in legislation to
punish certain offenses in violation thereof as criminal offenses.9
Based upon this background, the Court concluded "[i]t would have
been passing strange for Ellsworth1 96 and this very Congress to vest
federal courts expressly with jurisdiction to entertain civil causes




192. Justice Souter admitted that "despite considerable scholarly attention, it is fair to
say that a consensus understanding of what Congress intended has proven elusive." Id. at
718-19.
193. In reaching this conclusion, Justice Souter specifically noted, "[T]here is every
reason to suppose that the First Congress did not pass the [ATCA] as a jurisdictional
convenience to be placed on the shelf for use by a future Congress or state legislature that
might, some day, authorize the creation of causes of action or itself decide to make some
element of the law of nations actionable for the benefit of foreigners." Id. at 719.
194. Id. at 716 (citing 21 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at
1136-37 (Gaillard Hunt ed. 1912).
195. See Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, §§ 8, 28,
1 Stat. 112, 113-14, 118 (1790) (recognizing as criminal offenses murder, robbery or other
capital crimes committed on the high seas, violations of safe conduct and assaults against
ambassadors).
196. Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, who was the principal draftsman of the ATCA,
was a member of the Connecticut legislature that heeded the Congressional resolution and
adopted implementing legislation. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. at 719.
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no effect whatever until the Congress should take further
action..'197
The historical record existing immediately after the adoption
of the ATCA also supported this conclusion. Early federal cases
addressing the ATCA gave no intimation that further
implementing legislation was necessary."' The 1795 opinion of
Attorney General William Bradford with respect to the criminal
prosecution of U.S. citizens participating in a French raid upon a
British slave colony in Sierra Leone recognized the possibility of a
civil remedy for the aggrieved without specific reference to the
need for implementing legislation.199 The reasonable inference
from these precedents was that the ATCA had immediate effect
upon its adoption. As a result, the Court held "[t]here is too much
in the historical record to believe that Congress would have
enacted the [ATCA] only to leave it lying fallow indefinitely.""
This history also led the Court to conclude that the ATCA
conferred jurisdiction upon federal courts for "a relatively modest
set of actions alleging violations of the law of nations."O'' This
"modest set of actions" included torts corresponding to
Blackstone's three primary offenses, specifically, violation of safe
conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors and piracy. °2
The Court found no basis to suspect that Congress intended to
include other offenses against the law of nations within the
ATCA's jurisdictional grant."3 However, the Court also found that
there were no congressional developments in the intervening 191
years from the adoption of the ATCA to its modern expression in
197. Id.
198. See, e.g., Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (C.C.D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607) (holding
the ATCA served as the jurisdictional basis for the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction over
a claim brought by a French privateer against the mortgagee of a British slave trading
vessel); Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942 (Pa. 1793) (No. 9895) (holding the ATCA
could not serve as the basis for federal jurisdiction for a damages claim arising from the
seizure of a British ship by a French privateer in U.S. waters).
199. See 1 Op. Att'y Gen, supra note 39, at 59. While expressing reservations about
criminal prosecution of the perpetrators, Attorney General Bradford was far more certain
of the likelihood of tort liability pursuant to the ATCA. In this regard, Attorney General
Bradford stated "there can be no doubt that the company or individuals who have been
injured by these acts of hostility have a remedy by a civil suit in the courts of the United
States; jurisdiction being expressly given to these courts in all cases where an alien sues for
a tort only, in violation of the laws of nations, or a treaty of the United States ... " Id.
200. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. at 719.
201. Id. at 720.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 724.
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Filartiga v. Peha-Irala that has precluded courts from "recognizing
a claim under the law of nations as an element of common law."20,
Nevertheless, the absence of amendments to or abolition of
the ATCA did not lead Justice Souter to adopt an unrestrained
view of the causes of action over which courts could exercise
jurisdiction. Rather, claims based upon the present-day law of
nations were required to "rest on a norm of international character
accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity
comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms [the
Court has] recognized. 2.5 This restraint was justified for several
reasons. Initially, the "prevailing conception" of the common law
changed since 1789 from one of discovery of governing principles
to wholesale judicial creation.0 6 The perception of federal common
law also changed with the Court's opinion in Erie Railway Co. v.
Tompkins.17 The legacy of Erie, specifically, the abolition of the
federal general common law and its withdrawal to specialized
fields or where necessary in interstitial areas of federal interest,
militated in favor of a policy of "legislative guidance before
exercising innovative authority over substantive law.,
208
204. Id. at 724-725. In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia objected to the perceived
expansion of federal jurisdiction to include violations of customary international law
beyond those within the contemplation of the First Congress. According to Justice Scalia,
the Framers would be "quite terrified" by the expansion of federal jurisdiction beyond
piracy, violations of safe conduct, interference with ambassadors and foreign sovereign
immunity. Id. at 749. Rather, Justice Scalia concluded that "[t]he notion that a law of
nations, redefined to mean the consensus of states on any subject, can be used by a private
citizen to control a sovereign's treatment of its own citizens within its own territory is a
20th-century invention of internationalist law professors and human-rights advocates." Id.
at 749-750 (emphasis in original).
205. Id. at 725.
206. Id. The Court noted in 1789 that the common law was accepted as "a
transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but obligatory within it unless
and until changed by statute." Id. (citing Black and White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v.
Brown and Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting)). However, the formulation of common law principles in the modern era has
increasingly relied on the exercise of judicial discretion. As noted by Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. in 1881, "[i]n substance the growth of the law is legislative . . .
[because] the very consideration which judges most rarely mention, and always with an
apology, are the secret root from which the law draws all the juices of life. I mean, of
course, considerations of what is expedient for the community concerned." OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 35 (Howe ed., 1963).
207. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
208. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. at 726. With respect to the ATCA, the Court
specifically noted it "would be remarkable to take a more aggressive role in exercising a
jurisdiction that remained largely in shadow for much of the prior two centuries." Id.
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However, the holding in Erie did not preclude "further
independent judicial recognition of actionable international
norms. 2.9 Rather, Justice Souter concluded, "judicial power should
be exercised on the understanding that the door is still ajar subject
to vigilant doorkeeping, and thus open to a narrow class of
international norms today.'21 According to the Court, Erie did not
bar judicial recognition of all new substantive rules of federal
common law; rather, it permitted such recognition in "identified
limited enclaves. '2" For over two centuries, one of these enclaves
included the law of nations. 12 The Court was unwilling to instruct
federal courts to "avert their gaze entirely" from such norms,
including those intended to protect individuals.213 Such aversion
was not within the understanding of the First Congress, which also
would not have, according to the Court, "expected federal courts
to lose all capacity to recognize enforceable international norms
simply because the common law might lose some metaphysical
cachet on the road to modern realism. '."2 "4 Rather, the legitimacy of
limited recognition of international norms by federal courts has
been assumed since the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit's decision in Filartiga.2 5 The Court noted that the U.S.
Congress has not contravened this legitimacy, but has
supplemented judicial determinations in this field through the
adoption of the TVPA."' Absent further congressional guidance,
there was no evidence that Congress had "shut the door to
[consideration of] the law of nations entirely" in federal courts.
The Court determined that the legislative branch had the
right to create private rights of action in the absence of an express
provision within existing statutes. ' This deference to the U.S.
Congress is prudent in the intersection of private rights of action
and international norms due to the "possible collateral
consequences of making international rules privately actionable. 1 9




213. Id. at 730.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 731.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 727 (citing Correctional Serv. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001);
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001)).
219. Id.
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These consequences include potential implications for U.S. foreign
relations, which make courts particularly wary of impingement
upon the discretion of the executive and legislative branches to
manage foreign affairs.220 Judicial recognition of causes of action
and the fashioning of remedies to address violations should thus
proceed, if at all, with "great caution. 22' Finally, there is no
congressional mandate to U.S. courts to define new violations of
international law actionable pursuant to the ATCA.222 Although
the TVPA provided such a mandate through the establishment of
"an unambiguous and modern basis for federal claims of torture
and extrajudicial killing,, 22 3 the mandate was limited to this narrow
range of claims. Further, Congress expressly manifested its intent
to limit judicial interpretation of human rights norms through
declarations that ratified instruments are not self-executing.2 4
As a result, the Court placed limitations on claims
recognizable pursuant to the ATCA's grant of jurisdiction. The
Court concluded international law norms were not recognizable
under federal common law if they have "less definite content and
acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms
familiar when [the ATCA] was enacted. ', 2' The Court cited piracy
and torture as two offenses consisting of definite conduct and
having acceptance among civilized nations."' These offenses were
examples of "a handful of heinous actions" that were specific,
universal and obligatory as to be actionable pursuant to the
220. Id.
221. Id. In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia acknowledged the potential adverse
consequences arising from the exercise of federal jurisdiction over claims arising under
customary norms of international law. In Justice Scalia's view, such consequences were not
reasons for courts to exercise "great caution" in adjudicating such claims. Rather, such
consequences were reasons why courts were not granted nor could be thought to possess
federal common-law-making powers with respect to the recognition of private causes of
action arising from the violation of customary international law. Id. at 747 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
222. Id. at 728.
223. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, pt.1, at 3 (1991)).
224. See, e.g., Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, 18 U.S.C. § 1092
(2000) (providing U.S. ratification of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide does not create a substantive or procedural right of private
enforcement); 138 CONG. REC. 8071 (1992) (declaring the substantive provisions of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are not self-executing).
225. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. at 753.
226. Id. (citing United States v. Smith, 5 Wheat. 153, 163-80 (1820) (piracy); Filartiga v.
Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) (torture)).
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ATCA.227  Thus, claims of violation of such norms were to be
gauged against the current state of international law, utilizing
sources recognized by the Court dating back to the decision in The
Paquete Habana.28
The Court then examined the two human rights instruments
by which Alvarez claimed the existence of an international norm
prohibiting arbitrary arrest. The Court dismissed the first of these
instruments, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, on the
basis that it was a statement of aspirations only and does not
impose binding obligations upon national governments by its own
force and effect. 229 More importantly, the Court rejected the
creation of such a norm on the basis of a prohibition contained
within the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.23 o
Although binding as a matter of international law, the Covenant
was ratified in the United States on the express understanding that
it was not self-executing and thus did not create obligations
2311
enforceable in federal courts.
227. Id. (citing In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475
(9th Cir. 1994) ("Actionable violations of international law must be of a norm that is
specific, universal and obligatory."); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781
(1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (concluding the limits of the ATCA's jurisdictional grant
are defined by violations of "definable, universal and obligatory norms")).
228. 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("[W]here there is no treaty, and no controlling executive
or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of
civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators...
for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is."). In his concurring opinion, Justice
Scalia expressed doubt that federal courts would limit themselves in such a manner as
suggested in the majority opinion. Justice Scalia noted "[fror over two decades now,
unelected federal judges have been usurping [Congress and the Executive's] lawmaking
power by converting what they regard as norms of international law into American law."
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. at 765 (Scalia, J., concurring). The majority's failure to
condemn this trend was evidence that the Court was "incapable of admitting that some
matters - any matters - are none of its business." Id. (emphasis in original). According to
Justice Scalia, the majority's opinion was an example of "Never Say Never Jurisprudence"
in which the Court "ignores its own conclusion that the [ATCA] provides only
jurisdiction, wags a finger at the lower courts for going too far, and then - repeating the
same formula the ambitious lower courts themselves have used - invites them to try again."
Id. (emphasis in original).
229. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. at 734-35. The Court specifically noted
Eleanor Roosevelt, one of the primary forces behind the adoption of the Universal
Declaration, characterized it as "'a statement of principles . . . setting up a common
standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations . . . [and] not a treaty or
international agreement ... impos[ing] legal obligations." Id. at 734 (citing EVAN LUARD,
THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 39,50 (1967)).
230. Id.
231. Id.
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The Court also concluded there was no specific, universal,
and obligatory international norm sanctioning arbitrary detention
occurring entirely within the borders of one state. The Court
described the implications of Alvarez's claim as "breathtaking" in
that it would "support a cause of action in federal court for any
arrest, anywhere in the world, unauthorized by the law of the
jurisdiction in which it took place, and would create a cause of
action for any seizure of an alien in violation of the Fourth
Amendment." '232 Such a result was inconsistent with applicable
statutory and case law.233 Any inability to demonstrate Sosa was
acting on behalf of the U.S. government at the time of Alvarez's
detention would require a further broadening of these principles to
include conduct by private parties. 4
In addition, Alvarez's claim lacked the necessary "state
policy" and "prolonged" nature to qualify as a specific and
universal norm.2 ' Although the exact meaning of these terms
remained an open question, the Court held that they clearly
required "a factual basis beyond relatively brief detention in
excess of positive authority. 2 6 Even assuming Alvarez's detention
was "prolonged" and the result of "state policy," it remained
impossible to determine if and when such detention achieved the
degree of certainty necessary to violate international law
characteristic of the offenses of piracy, interference with
ambassadors, and violation of safe conduct identified by
Blackstone."' As such, the Court concluded the principle advanced
by Alvarez in his claim remained, "in the present, imperfect world
... an aspiration that exceeds any binding customary rule having
the specificity [the Court] requires." '38 The creation of a private
cause of action under such circumstances in furtherance of this
aspiration would, in the Court's judgment, exceed the bounds of
exercisable residual common law discretion possessed by the
232. Id. at 736.
233. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000); Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents,
403 U.S. 388 (1971) (creating damages remedies in federal courts for activities of law
enforcement personnel in violation of the Fourth Amendment)).
234. Id.
235. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF U.S. § 702
(1987)).
236. Id. at 756-57.




federal judiciary. As a result, the Court reversed the judgment of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
IV. THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE UNBOUND: THE
IMPLICATIONS OF ALVAREZ-MACHAIN FOR FUTURE ATCA
LITIGATION
The Supreme Court's decision in Alvarez-Machain left the
door slightly open to "further independent judicial recognition of
actionable international norms" under the ATCA.2 39 The following
discussion analyzes various international human rights instruments
in light of Alvarez-Machain to determine which instruments are
"specific, universal and obligatory" enough for an actionable
ATCA claim against transnational corporations.
A. Human Rights Associated with Personal Welfare
1. Security
The right to security appears in seven international and
regional human rights instruments. The most widespread
recognition of the right to security is in the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR").2 ° However, the ICCPR
offers no elaboration on the parameters of this right. Even
assuming the right to security could be adequately defined, Article
9(1) merely establishes a right without creating a concomitant
prohibition upon its violation. As such, Article 9(1) cannot be
convincingly characterized as establishing a readily definable right
or definitive statement of infringing conduct as to be specific for
purposes of the ATCA.
Furthermore, although the ICCPR is universal, it is not
obligatory. The ICCPR is clearly universal given its ratification by
152 states at the time of the preparation of this Article. 241 The
United States is among these states, having signed the ICCPR on
October 5, 1977, and ratified it on September 8, 1992.22 However,
in its reservations, declarations, and understandings adopted
during the course of debate in the U.S. Senate, Article 9 was
239. Id. at 752.
240. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 69, art. 9(1)
("Everyone has the right to ... security of person.").
241. Office of the United Nations High Comm'r for Human Rights, Status of Ratifications
of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties 12 (June 2004).
242. Id. at 11.
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designated as non-self-executing. 243 This declaration renders
Article 9 non-binding on the United States in the absence of
implementing legislation, which has not been enacted to date. The
absence of such implementing legislation also renders Article 9
unenforceable in U.S. courts. 2" The implementing legislation,
rather than the ICCPR itself, is to be given effect as law in the
United States.45
This conclusion is not altered by resort to regional human
rights instruments. Although three instruments in the Inter-
American human rights system establish a right to security, none
of these instruments goes beyond the mere creation of the right to
define its parameters or conduct in violation thereof. 2 '
Furthermore, two of these instruments are not universal.
Specifically, the American Convention on Human Rights
("ACHR") is not universal to the extent that it has only been
ratified by twenty-five of the thirty-four states within the Inter-
American system. 7 Of the nine states failing to ratify the ACHR,
two are of primary importance, specifically, Canada and the
United States.2" A stronger case may be advanced for the Inter-
American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and
Eradication of Violence Against Women given its ratification by
thirty-one states." 9 Nevertheless, once again the absence of
ratifications by Canada and the United States prevents the
recognition of the right to security as possessing universal status."'
The failure of the United States to ratify the ACHR and the
243. INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, 138 CONG.
REC. S4781-01, art. 111(1) (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) [hereinafter ICCPR CONG. REC.].
244. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF U.S. § 111(3) (1987)
("[A] 'non-self-executing' agreement will not be given effect as law in the absence of
necessary implementation.").
245. Id. § 111 cmt. h.
246. Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of
Violence Against Women art. 4(c), June 9, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1534 (granting every woman
the right to personal security)[hereinafter ICPPEVW]; American Convention on Human
Rights, supra note 160, art. 7(1) ("Every person has the right to... security."); American
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, supra note 97, art. I ("Every human being
has the right to... the security of his person.").
247. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov.
22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, available at http://cidh.org/Basicosfbasic4.htm.
248. Id.
249. Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention to Prevent and





Eradication of Violence Against Women deprives - these
documents of an obligatory nature and further renders them
nonactionable pursuant to the ATCA. Only the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man may possess
universal status as the founding instrument for the Inter-American
human rights system and one of the foundations of the
Organization of American States ("OAS")."' Nevertheless, the
American Declaration is, as its title implies, merely a declaration
of aspirations lacking enforceability in U.S. courts.
This conclusion also is not altered by reference to the right to
security in United Nations' human rights instruments.2 13 None of
these instruments defines the right to security or conduct in
violation thereof. It bears to note that, although not defining the
right to security, the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearance does provide that enforced
disappearance violates "human dignity." 2" However, the
Declaration fails to define the term "enforced disappearance" and
thus cannot be characterized as possessing the requisite degree of
specificity. Furthermore, although each of these three resolutions
may be characterized as universal given their adoption by the
United Nations General Assembly, they are, in a manner identical
to the American Declaration, nonactionable declarations of
aspirations. This conclusion is consistent with the holding in Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain that statements of aspirations such as the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") are not
251. U.N. Enable, Compilation of International Norms and Standards Relating to
Disability, Part III: Regional Human Rights, available at
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/discom302.htm.
252. The American Declaration was neither conceived nor drafted as a treaty and did
not create a contractual judicial obligation. Advisory Opinion, Interpretation of the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man Within the Framework of Article
64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, 1989 Inter-Am. C.H.R. (ser. A) No. 10,
at 9 (July 14, 1989), available at http://www.corteidh.or.ccr/seriea)ing/index.html.
253. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104,
art. 3(c), U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/Res/48/104 (Dec. 20, 1993)
("Women are entitled to the right to .'. . security of person."); Declaration on the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, G.A. Res. 47/133, art. 1(2), U.N.
GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/Res/47/133 (Dec. 18, 1992) (noting acts of
enforced disappearance violate the right to security of the person); Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, supra note 97, art. 3 ("Everyone has the right to . . . security of
person.").
254. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances,
supra note 253, art. 1(1).
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obligatory and cannot be used as the basis of a cause of action in
U.S. courts.255
2. Life
The right to life appears in ten human rights instruments. As
noted with respect to the right to security, the right to life is
universally recognized in the ICCPR." However, the ICCPR
offers no further elaboration other than that this right, however it
may be defined, is to be protected by law. Thus, the right to life in
ICCPR cannot be convincingly characterized as establishing a
right specific enough for purposes of the ATCA. Furthermore, as
previously noted, although the ICCPR is universal, it is not
obligatory for purposes of the ATCA. In its reservations,
declarations and understandings, the U.S. Senate designated
Article 6 as non-self-executing.2 This declaration renders Article 6
non-binding on the United States in the absence of implementing
legislation and thus unenforceable in U.S. courts.
The right to life is referenced in two additional human rights
conventions. The Convention on the Rights of the Child ("CRC")
recognizes that "every child has the inherent right to life. 2 '58 This
right requires states to "ensure to the maximum extent possible
the survival and development of the child. 2 9 This elaboration,
however, is insufficient to render Article 6 specific for purposes of
the ATCA. Although survival of the child is inarguably identical
to preservation of life, the scope of the legal obligation to
contribute to the child's "development" is an open question. Even
more nonspecific is the requirement to ensure the survival of the
child to the "maximum extent possible." Not only is it uncertain as
to what form such protection is to take, be it financial or through
the adoption of appropriate social legislation, but it is equally
unclear what constitutes the "maximum extent possible" or
limitations that render further supportive efforts impossible.
In any event, compliance with the requirements of the CRC is
not obligatory upon the United States. This Convention is one of
the most universal of all of the principal international human
255. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 755 (2004).
256. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 69, art. 6(1)
("Every human being has the inherent right to life.").
257. ICCPR CONG. REC., supra note 243, art. 3(1).
258. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 96, art. 6(1).
259. Id. art. 6(2).
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rights treaties, having been ratified by 192 states at the time of the
preparation of this Article."° Only two states have failed to ratify
or accede to the Convention. One of these states is the United
States, which signed the Convention on February 16, 1995, but has
failed to ratify it.26 ' The absence of ratification renders the
Convention nonobligatory and therefore non-actionable in U.S.
courts.
The Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War ("Geneva Convention IV") 262 and
the Protocol Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts ("Protocol II") both contain
protections of the right to life.2 63 Although it does not define life,
Articles 3 and 32 of Geneva Convention IV prohibit acts resulting
in "[v]iolence to life" and the "extermination of protected
persons. ' 26  Similarly, Protocol II prohibits acts resulting in
"violence to life." 6 Furthermore, the universality of these
instruments is indisputable. Geneva Convention IV has been
ratified or acceded to by 192 states, including the United States,
which ratified it on August 2, 1955. Protocol II has been ratified
or acceded to by 157 states.67
Despite the United State's ratification, however, there is no
indication that Geneva Convention IV manifests an intention to be
self-executing without the enactment of enabling legislation, nor
that the United States intended such result at the time of its
ratification." Furthermore, the creation of a private remedy
260. Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties,
supra note 241.
261. Id. at 11. The other state failing to ratify or accede to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child is Somalia. Id. at 10.
262. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
arts. 3(1)(a), 32, Oct. 21, 1950, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention IV].
263. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention Relating to the Protection of
Victims on Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 4(2)(a), June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol II].
264. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 262.
265. Protocol II, supra note 263.
266. Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC], States Party to the Geneva Conventions,
available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/genevaconventions.
267. ICRC, States Party to the Geneva Convention Protocols, available at
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteengO.nsf/html/genevaconventions.
268. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF U.S. § 111 (4)(a)-(c)
(1987) (providing an international agreement is non-self-executing "if the agreement
manifests an intention that it shall not become effective as domestic law without the
enactment of implementing legislation; if the Senate in giving consent to a treaty, or
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actionable in U.S. courts as a result of such violation is inconsistent
with the general rule that affected individuals do not have direct
remedies against human rights violators except where expressly
provided by international agreement. 269 In any event, both
instruments, Geneva Convention IV and Protocol II, have very
limited applicability, specifically, the protection of civilian
populations in the event of war in the case of Geneva Convention
IV and protection of persons in the event of non-international
conflicts in the case of Protocol II. These limitations make their
application to transnational corporations unlikely.
This result is not altered by resort to regional or United
Nations' human rights instruments. Two of the instruments in the
Inter-American human rights system establishing the right to life
fail to go beyond the mere creation of the right and define its
parameters or conduct in violation thereof.27 ° Furthermore, one of
these instruments, the Inter-American Convention on the
Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against
Women, is not universal given the absence of ratifications by
Canada and the United States." And, as previously discussed,
while the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man
may be universal as one of the founding instruments of the OAS, it
is merely a declaration of aspirations lacking legal standing in U.S.
courts.
The right to life as set forth in the ACHR presents different
issues." Article 4(1) not only provides every person with the right
to have his life respected but requires that this right be subject to
legal protections from the moment of conception."' The addition
of required legal protection and implicit prohibition upon acts
inconsistent with the preservation of life as well as a chronological
reference point for the attachment of this right arguably lends it an
air of specificity absent from pronouncements in other human
Congress by resolution, requires implementing legislation, or if implementing legislation is
constitutionally required").
269. Id. § 703 cmt. c.
270. ICPPEVW, supra note 246, art. 4(a) ("Every woman has the right to... have her
life respected."); see also American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, supra
note 97, art. 1 ( "Every human being has the right to life.").
271. Inter-American Commission of Women, Status of Signing and Ratification of the
Convention of Belem do Para (2000), available at
http://www.oas.org/cim/English/laws.rat.belem.htm.
272. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 160, art. 4(1) ("Every person




rights instruments. However, the ACHR is not universal, and thus
not obligatory on the United States.
None of the United Nations' human rights instruments
referring to the right to life define the right or conduct deemed to
be in violation.274 Although the Declaration on the Protection of
All Persons from Enforced Disappearance does provide that such
practice "constitutes a grave threat to the right to life," it fails to
possess the requisite degree of specificity given the absence of a
definition for the term "enforced disappearance. 275 Furthermore,
despite their universal nature, each of these resolutions is a
nonactionable declaration of aspirations and thus not obligatory.
3. Health
The right to health is instrumental to the determination of
personal welfare. This right is set forth in eight human rights
instruments. The right to health established in these instruments
presents the same difficulties as the rights associated with security
and life with respect to enforcement pursuant to the ATCA.
The right to health appears most prominently in three
covenants and conventions. The first such instrument is the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
("ICESCR"). Article 12(1) provides "[t]he States Parties to the
present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and
mental health. 2 76 States are instructed to achieve full realization of
this right through efforts to reduce infant mortality, improve
environmental hygiene, prevent, treat and control epidemic,
endemic and occupational diseases and assure the provision of
medical services to all persons.277 This right, along with other rights
secured by the ICESCR, has been recognized by 149 states at the
274. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, supra note 253, art.
3(a) ("Women are entitled to ... [tjhe right to life."); Declaration on the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearances, supra note 253, art. 1(1) (noting acts of enforced
disappearance constitute "a grave threat to the right to life"); Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, supra note 97, art. 3 ("Everyone has the right to life.").
275. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances,
supra note 253, art. 1(1).
276. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 69,
art. 12(1).
277. Id. art. 12(2)(a)-(d).
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time of the preparation of this article and is thus universal in
scope.
Despite this universal recognition, the right to health as set
forth in the ICESCR is not specific or obligatory as to be
enforceable pursuant to the ATCA. What constitutes good health,
let alone its "highest attainable standard," is not defined in the
ICESCR or subject to universal agreement. There are wide
differences in health standards between the states party to the
ICESCR. These differences not only span members of the
developed and developing world but also encompass differences
between private and government subsidized health care models in
the developed world.279 As previously noted, Article 12(2) does
provide some guidance to states with respect to their duties
regarding public health. However, these statements constitute
goals rather than specific actions required of states to achieve the
"highest attainable standard" of health.2 0 Article 12 thus lacks the
requisite degree of specificity necessary to be actionable pursuant
to the ATCA.
Article 12 also lacks the required obligatory nature to be
actionable pursuant to the ATCA. Initially, although all members
of the developed world and the most populous states in the
developing world (except Indonesia and Pakistan) are parties,
ICESCR has never been ratified by the United States.21' Even
assuming the absence of ratification is irrelevant to its obligatory
nature, the language of the ICESCR itself overcomes any attempt
to render its provisions mandatory. For example, Article 2(1)
conditions achievement of the goals set forth in the ICESCR on
availability of state resources. Article 2(1) also lacks anobligatory nature to the extent it permits progressive
278. Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties,
supra note 241, at 11.
279. See generally U.N. Dev. Programme [UNDP], Human Development Report
Office, Occasional Paper: Inequality in the U.S. Healthcare System, U.N. Doc. 2005/36
(2005) (prepared by Devi Sridhar), available at
http://hdr.undp.org/docs/publications/background-papers/2005/HDR2005-Sridhar-Devi-3
6.pdf
280. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 69,
art. 12.
281. Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties,
supra note 241, at 11.
282. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 69,
art. 2(1) (conditioning the undertaking of steps to attain the rights set forth in the
Covenant on each state's "available resources").
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implementation of the rights set forth therein without establishing
a time within which states are to achieve their realization.23
Furthermore, there are no required methods by which states are to
implement these rights. Rather, states are instructed to use "all
appropriate means."' Additional evidence of the nonobligatory
nature of the ICESCR may be found in Article 4, which permits
states to limit the enjoyment of such rights as is "compatible with
the nature of these rights and ... for the purpose of promoting the
general welfare in a democratic society."2" States are thus free to
limit or ignore rights contained within the ICESCR as long as
there is some excuse consistent with the amorphous standard of
"promotion of the general welfare." The leeway granted to states
as a result of this provision is far too great to allow for the
conclusion that the ICESCR imposes specific and obligatory
standards upon signatory states.
The second convention referencing the right to health is the
CRC. In language identical to the ICESCR, Article 24(1) of the
CRC provides for state recognition of the right of children to
"enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health."2 States
are instructed to "pursue full implementation of this right"
through efforts to diminish infant and child mortality, ensure the
provision of medical services to children and mothers, combat
disease and malnutrition through access to "adequate nutritious
foods and clean drinking water," and provide parents with basic
knowledge of children's health and nutrition.87 In addition, states
are instructed to take "all effective and appropriate measures" to
ensure abolition of traditional practices detrimental to children's
health.' This right and ensuing obligations are universal due to
their recognition by 192 states at the time of the preparation of this
Article.289
Despite this universal recognition, the right to health as set
forth in the CRC is not specific or obligatory for the same reasons
as the ICESCR. This right is rendered nonspecific by the use of the
283. Id. (providing states are to achieve "progressively the full realization of the rights
recognized in the present Covenant").
284. Id.
285. Id. art. 4.
286. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 96, art. 24(1).
287. Id. art. 24(2)(a)-(f).
288. Id. art. 24(3).
289. Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties,
supra note 241.
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term "highest attainable standard," which is not defined in the
CRC or subject to universal agreement.290 As previously noted in
the discussion of the ICESCR, there are wide differences in health
standards between the states party to the CRC. Article 24 does
provide some guidance with respect to improving health standards
for children. However, these statements constitute goals rather
than specific actions, and it is also unclear whether such actions
constitute "all effective and appropriate measures" to ensure the
health of children.2 91 Article 24 thus lacks the requisite degree of
specificity necessary to be actionable pursuant to the ATCA.
Article 24 also lacks the required obligatory nature to be
actionable pursuant to the ATCA. Despite its universal nature
given its ratification by 192 states, the United States is one of two
states that have failed to ratify or accede to the CRC.292
In addition, the language of the CRC renders its provisions
nonobligatory. For example, Article 24(4) lacks an obligatory
nature to the extent it permits progressive implementation of the
rights set forth therein without establishing a time within which
states are to achieve their realization.29 ' Furthermore, there are no
required methods by which states are to achieve and implement
these rights. Although Article 24 sets forth the ends to be
achieved, the measures by which to accomplish these ends are
absent. There is thus an absence of means that a court could
impose upon a state to achieve the goals of Article 24.
The third convention referencing the right to health is
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions Relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts ("Protocol I,).294
Article 11(1) requires the protection of the physical and
mental health and integrity of persons in the power of adverse
parties during an international conflict.295 Protocol I further
prohibits endangerment of such persons' health as a result of "any
unjustified act or omission" including physical mutilation and
290. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 96, art. 24(1).
291. Id. art. 24(3).
292. Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties,
supra note 241.
293. Convention on the Right of the Child, supra note 96, art. 24(4) (providing states
are to achieve "progressively the full realization of the right recognized in the present
article").
294. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Protocol I].
295. Id. art. 11(1).
438 [Vol. 28:393
Lohengrin Revealed
experimentation.296 Although "unjustified acts or omissions" are
not defined, their meaning may be ascertained from prohibitions
that immediately follow, such as physical mutilation and medical
or scientific experimentation.2 " Article 11 also does not contain
the ambiguous terminology that plagues the health-related
provisions of the ICESCR and CRC such as "highest attainable
standard of health," "all effective and appropriate means" and
"general welfare in a democratic society."2 8 In so doing, it is more
specific than the health-related provisions of these instruments.
Furthermore, the universality of Protocol I is indisputable,
having been ratified or acceded to by 162 states at the time of
preparation of this article. 299 However, Protocol I is not obligatory
upon the United States as it has not ratified or acceded to Protocol
I. As such, the obligations set forth therein are not binding on the
United States, nor is it an adequate basis for private civil litigation
in U.S. courts. Even if Protocol I were to be ratified by the United
States, there is no reason to believe the U.S. Senate would
manifest an intention for it to be self-executing without the
enactment of enabling legislation. In any event, Protocol I is very
limited in scope, specifically, the protection of victims of
international armed conflict, thereby rendering its application to
transnational corporations unlikely.
The right to health is also referenced in two Inter-American
human rights instruments. Article XI of the American Declaration
of the Rights and Duties of Man provides, in part, that "[e]very
person has the right to the preservation of his health through
sanitary and social measure relating to food, clothing, housing and
medical care, to the extent permitted by public and community
resources." 30 Although the American Declaration may be
universal as one of the founding instruments of the OAS, it is not
specific or obligatory for purposes of enforcement in a private civil
action in the United States. Article XI fails to elaborate on the
steps to be taken by states to preserve the health of their
296. Id.
297. Id. art. 11(2)(a)-(b).
298. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 96, arts. 24(l), 24(3);
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 69, arts. 4,
12.
299. Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC], States Party to the Geneva Convention and
their Additional Protocols (Dec. 4, 2005),
http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng9.nsfhtml/party-gc.
300. American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, supra note 97, art. 9.
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citizenry. 1 Specifically, the "sanitary and social measures" to be
undertaken are not set forth in any detail other than that they
should relate to food, clothing, housing and medical care.g
Additional evidence of the nonspecific nature of Article XI may
be found in its language limiting the obligation of states to "the
extent permitted by public and community resources," an
undefined standard permitting states to ignore or limit health
protections.3 3 This wide discretion leads to the conclusion that
Article XI is nonspecific as well as nonobligatory. Furthermore,
the American Declaration is merely a statement of goals and
aspirations rather than a mandatory body of standards enforceable
upon states in a court of law.3°4
The right to health is elaborated upon in greater detail in the
Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human
Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.05
Article 10 states that "[e]veryone shall have the right to health,
understood to mean the enjoyment of the highest level of physical,
mental and social well-being."3 Article 10 sets forth six separate
obligations for states to achieve this goal, including universal
primary health care, immunization programs, disease treatment
and prevention, education and "[s]atisfaction of the health needs
of the highest risk groups and of those whose poverty makes them
the most vulnerable.,
307
This provision remains nonspecific despite the elaboration of
these obligations. As previously noted with respect to the ICESCR
and CRC, what constitutes enjoyment of health at its "highest
level" remains subject to debate. 08 Although Article 10(2) does
provide some guidance to states with respect to improving health
standards, these statements do not place specific duties on states
enforceable by courts. The means by which states are to achieve





305. Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1988 O.A.S. T.S. No. 69 (1988), reprinted in
BASIC DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN
SYSTEM, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1, art. 10(1), at 67 (1992).
306. Id.
307. Id. art. 10(2)(a)-(f).




educate citizens are undefined and left to the discretion of
individual states. 309 Of perhaps greatest uncertainty is the
identification of "high risk 'groups" and those in "poverty" whose
health needs are identified as of primary urgency. Not only does
Article 10 fail to set forth means for identifying such groups, but it
also fails to establish standards by which "satisfaction" of these
groups' health needs may be measured. Thus, these statements
constitute goals rather than specific actions required of states to
achieve the enjoyment of health at its "highest level."
Article 10 also lacks the required universal and obligatory
nature to be actionable pursuant to the ATCA. Only nineteen of
the thirty-four states constituting the membership of the Inter-
American human rights system are party to the Additional
Protocol."' Of these nineteen, only thirteen states have ratified or
acceded to its provisions." Further evidence of the absence of
universality is the failure of two important members of the Inter-
American human rights system to sign the Additional Protocol,
specifically the United States and Canada."2 The absence of U.S.
ratification of the underlying American Convention and signature
or ratification of the Additional Protocol renders it nonobligatory.
Finally, the right to health is set forth in three United Nations'
declarations."' Despite their apparent universal nature stemming
from their adoption by the United Nations General Assembly,
none of these declarations is specific or obligatory. The
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women
merely refers to the entitlement of women to the "highest standard
attainable of physical and mental health" without further
elaboration and is thus as nonspecific as other instruments
309. Id. Art. 12(2)(c); Convention on the Right of the Child, supra note 96, art.
24(2)(e).
310. Org. of American States, Signatures and Current Status of Ratification of the
Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of




313. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, supra note 253, art.
3(f) ("Women are entitled to [t]he right to the highest standard attainable of physical and
mental health."); Declaration on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 1386, art. 4, U.N.
GAOR, 14th Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A14354 (Nov. 20, 1959) (providing that
children have the right to health); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 97,
art. 25 ("Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-
being of himself and of his family.").
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containing similar references."4 Principle 4 of the Declaration of
the Rights of the Child is equally vague in bestowing upon children
the entitlement to "grow and develop in health."3 '5 Further
language attempting to elaborate upon this entitlement by
providing for pre-natal and post-natal care, nutrition, housing,
recreation, and medical services is unhelpful to the extent that
each of these methods of achieving healthy growth and
development is prefaced by "adequate." 16 The undefined use of
this term also renders the UDHR's reference to a standard of
living "adequate" for health equally vague and nonspecific.3"7
Furthermore, despite their universal nature, each of these
resolutions is a nonactionable declaration of aspirations and thus
not obligatory.318
4. Healthy Environment
The right to a healthy environment is set forth in six
international and regional human rights instruments."9 The right
initially appears in Article 12(2)(b) of the ICESCR, which
provides "[t]he steps to be taken by the States Parties to the
present Covenant to achieve the full realization of [the right to
health] shall include those necessary for ... [t]he improvement of
all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene." ' 321 As
previously noted with respect to its right to health, despite its
universal recognition, the right to "environmental hygiene" as set
forth in the ICESCR is not specific or obligatory as to be
enforceable pursuant to the ATCA. 321 What constitutes
"environmental hygiene" or acceptable standards thereof are not
defined in the ICESCR and are not subject to universal
314. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, supra note 253, art.
3(f).
315. Declaration on the Rights of the Child, supra note 313, art. 4.
316. Id.
317. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 97, art. 25.
318. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, supra note 231,
pmbl; Declaration on the Rights of the Child, supra note 313, pmbl.; Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 97, pmbl.
319. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 75, arts. 207, 213,
235 (requiring states to adopt measures to eliminate, reduce or control marine pollution
from land-based sources and providing for state responsibility and liability for marine
pollution); Rio Declaration on the Environment and Development, supra note 83, princ. 4
(deeming environmental protection to be an integral part of economic development).





agreement. Furthermore, Article 12(2), including the improvement
of environmental hygiene, constitutes a statement of goals rather
than specific actions required of states to achieve the "highest
attainable standard" of health.3 2
This statement of goals also lacks the required obligatory
nature to be actionable pursuant to the ATCA due to the absence
of U.S. ratification and the language of the ICESCR itself. Of
specific application with respect to environmental hygiene is
Article 25, which provides "[n]othing in the present Covenant shall
be interpreted as impairing the inherent right of all peoples to
enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and
resources."' 23 Environmental protection is thus secondary to the
exploitation of natural resources. This subordination of
environmental interests not only renders the right to
environmental hygiene nonobligatory but also nonspecific as
"enjoyment" and "full and free utilization of natural wealth and
resources" are not defined in the ICESCR. This lack of readily
cognizable standards prevents the enforcement of the ICESCR's
environmental standards pursuant to the ATCA.
The right to a healthy environment is also set forth in
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. Article 55 requires
protection of the environment against "widespread, long-term and
severe damage" during international warfare.2 ' The duty of care
owed by states engaged in such warfare is defined as refraining
from methods and means of warfare intended or expected to cause
such damage to the environment and attacks on the environment
by way of reprisals.323 This standard is specific to the extent it
adopts tort standards and defines prohibited warfare as such where
the environmental impact was intended, known, or should have
been known.
If Article 55 lacks adequate definition, it is in the
determination of the impact of the warfare on the environment,
which must be "widespread, long-term and severe. 32 6 Although
obviously necessary in order to differentiate between permissible
and prohibited forms of warfare, these three qualifications are
insufficiently specific for purposes of private civil litigation
322. Id. art 12(1).
323. Id. art. 25.
324. Protocol 1, supra note 294, art. 55(1).
325. Id. art. 55(1)-(2).
326. Id. art. 55(1).
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pursuant to the ATCA. Article 55 defines the purpose of its
measures as the protection of the health and survival of impacted
peoples.327 Theoretically, this could include untold numbers of
people dispersed over a geographic area spanning hundreds, if not
thousands, of miles. Not only is the geographic scope of such
impact undefined, but distinctions between areas suffering the
primary effects of prohibited forms of warfare and other areas
suffering secondary effects are absent as well. Specific
chronological limitations are also absent from the prohibition
upon forms of warfare having "long-term" effects. Although
rendered somewhat clearer by the stated purposes of Article 55,
what constitutes a "severe" environmental impact remains an open
question and is far too indeterminate to serve as the basis for
private civil litigation. Finally, Protocol I is not obligatory upon the
United States due to the absence of ratification or accession and is
very limited in scope, thereby rendering its application to
transnational corporations unlikely.
The right to a healthy environment also appears in the
Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human
Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
Article 11 provides that "[e]veryone shall have the right to live in a
healthy environment ... [and] States Parties shall promote the
protection, preservation and improvement of the environment.
'32 8
Article 11 cannot provide the basis for an ATCA claim, since it is
not specific, universal, or obligatory. As previously noted with
respect to the ICESCR, the term "healthy environment" remains
indeterminate without an accompanying definition, which is
completely absent from Article 11.129 Furthermore, Article 11
lacks the required universal and obligatory nature due to its
ratification by only thirteen of the thirty-four states constituting
the membership of the Inter-American human rights system and
the absence of signature or ratification by Canada and the United
States.33o
Environmental protection is specifically referenced in two
U.N. declarations. Article 13(c) of the Declaration on Social
327. Id.
328. Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 305, art. 11(1)-(2).
329. Id.




Progress and Development provides that one of the main goals of
social progress and development is "[t]he protection and
improvement of the human environment. 331 This goal is to be
attained, in part, through the establishment of national and
international legal and administrative measures.32 This instruction
is more specific than the ICESCR or the Additional Protocol to
the extent it defines what actions states are to undertake in order
to protect, preserve and improve the environment. Nevertheless,
these directives do not impose readily enforceable obligations
upon states with respect to pollution originating from enumerated
sources and damaging identified sectors of the environment. The
obligation to protect and improve the environment is also subject
to the sovereignty of states over their natural wealth and
resources. This condition further renders the Declaration on
Social Progress nonspecific as states may defend environmentally
harmful practices as exercises of sovereignty. This defense further
negates any contention the environmental provisions of the
Declaration are obligatory by providing states with an excuse the
definition of which is within their sole determination.
Furthermore, the punishment of violations through the creation of
an enforcement mechanism is not addressed in the Declaration, let
alone compensable in national courts possessing authority to grant
appropriate remedies. Finally, like all other declarations of the
United Nations General Assembly, the Declaration on Social
Progress is a nonactionable statement of aspirations.
Environmental protection as provided in the Rio Declaration
on the Environment and Development presents similar problems.
The Rio Declaration provides that environmental protection is an
integral part of economic development. " The level of
environmental protection contemplated by this statement is not
sufficient to provide judicially enforceable standards. The Rio
Declaration fails to set forth what specific actions states are to take
to achieve balance between environmental protection and
development. "' Furthermore, Principle 2 grants states the
sovereign right to exploit their natural resources within their
331. Declaration on Social Progress and Development, G.A. Res. 2542, art. 13(c), U.N.
GAOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 30, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (Dec. 11, 1969).
332. Id. art. 25(a).
333. Id. art. 3(d).
334. Rio Declaration on the Environment and Development, supra note 83, princ. 4.
335. Id.
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336
boundaries pursuant to their own environmental policies. As in
the case of the Declaration on Social Progress, this condition
renders the Rio Declaration nonspecific as states may defend
environmentally harmful practices as exercises of sovereignty over
their natural resources.337 Any specific policy is also qualified by
recognition that environmental standards applicable in one state
may be inappropriate in another state or may impose unacceptable
economic and social costs. 38 This is particularly the case with
respect to standards in developed and developing states.339 The
wide differences in environmental standards between states and in
particular members of the developed and developing world further
cloud the definiteness of the Rio Declaration and render it
incapable of judicial enforcement.
Leaving aside the nonbinding nature of declarations, the Rio
Declaration's lack of specificity also renders it nonobligatory. The
exceptions for resource exploitation and social and economic costs
provide states with explanations to justify any scheme of
environmental protection or the absence thereof.34 0 As such, there
is no obligation that may be enforced upon states. Even if such
obligations existed, the Rio Declaration lacks enforcement
mechanisms. The Rio Declaration therefore cannot serve as the
basis for future ATCA actions.
The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea has also served
as the basis for ATCA claims in U.S. courts. Three articles have
been specifically cited in such claims. Article 207 requires states to
adopt laws and regulations and undertake measures to "prevent,
reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from
land-based sources." 1 This obligation is to include efforts to
minimize the release of "toxic, harmful or noxious substances,
especially those which are persistent, into the marine
environment." 342 Article 213 requires enforcement of laws,
regulations and standards adopted pursuant to Article 207 as well
as rules and standards established by international organizations,





340. Id. princ. 2.
341. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 75, art. 207(1)-(2).
342. Id. art. 207(5).
343. Id. art. 213.
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responsible for fulfilling their obligations with respect to
preservation of the marine environment and are liable in
accordance with international law for any failures.344 States are also
responsible for establishing avenues of recourse within their
respective legal systems for injured parties and "prompt and
adequate compensation" for damages resulting from failure to
protect the marine environment. 5
Unlike the general instruction to adopt protective measures
contained in the Declaration on Social Progress, these articles
impose specific obligations upon states with respect to pollution
originating from an enumerated source and damaging to an
identified sector of the environment. States are obligated to adopt
and enforce national laws and regulations as well as abide by
international standards designed specifically to prevent, reduce
and control such pollution. Although undefined, particular
emphasis is to be placed upon preventing the release of toxic,
harmful and noxious substances.347 Violations of these obligations
are compensable in national courts, which are authorized to grant
appropriate remedies, including monetary relief. To this extent,
the articles of the Law of the Sea Convention relating to land-
based sources of marine pollution are remarkably specific.
Furthermore, these obligations are universally recognized by
the international community. The Law of the Sea Convention has
been ratified or acceded to by 149 states at the time of preparation
of this article.?8 This list includes every developed state and most
of the developing world, including, significantly, China, India, and
the Russian Federation.3 49 However, the United States is one of
thirty-nine states yet to ratify or accede to the Law of the Sea
Convention.30  As a result, despite its high degree of specificity
and its universal acceptance, the Law of the Sea Convention is not
obligatory on the United States and cannot serve as the basis for a
private civil action pursuant to the ATCA.
344. Id. art. 235(1).
345. Id. art. 235(2).
346. Id. art. 235.
347. Id. art. 207 (5).
348. U.N. Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Chronological Lists of
Ratifications of, Accessions and Successions to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the
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5. Summary and Extrajudicial Execution
Closely related to the right to security, life, and health is the
right to be free from summary or extrajudicial execution. This
right appears in four treaties, conventions and declarations.
However, unlike the previously discussed rights, it is much more
difficult to conclude this right is not specific, universal and
obligatory for purposes of the ATCA.
The most universal recognition of the right to be free from
summary or extrajudicial execution is in Geneva Convention IV
and the ICCPR. Article 6(1) of the ICCPR simply states that "[no
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life. 35' The ICCPR fails to
define the circumstances constituting such a deprivation from
which states are to abstain. The universal nature of the ICCPR is
insufficient to overcome this lack of specificity for purposes of the
ATCA. Furthermore, as previously noted, Article 6 is not
obligatory as it has been designated as non-self-executing in the
United States, and no implementing legislation is currently in force
and effect.
The prohibition upon summary execution in Geneva
Convention IV presents a more difficult issue. Article 3(1)(a)
prohibits "murder of all kinds."3 '2 This prohibition is further
elaborated upon in Article 3(1)(d), which bars the "passing of
sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording
all judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by
civilized people." 313 Although the definitions of "regularly
constituted court" and "indispensable judicial guarantees" may be
subject to interpretation, Section 3(1)(d) is a classic restatement of
the widely accepted definition of summary or extrajudicial
execution.3 " Furthermore, as previously noted, the universality of
Geneva Convention IV is indisputable. "' Thus, Geneva
351. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 69, art. 6(1).
352. Geneva Convention.IV, supra note 262, art. 3(1)(a).
353. Id. art. 3(1)(d).
354. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF U.S. § 702
cmt. f (1987) (defining summary execution as the killing of an individual "other than as
lawful punishment pursuant to conviction in accordance with due process of law, or as
necessary under exigent circumstances").
355. Orna Ben-Naftali & Keren R. Michaeli, 'We Must Not Make a Scarecrow of the




Convention IV meets the specific and universal portions of Justice
Souter's standard.
However, Geneva Convention IV is not obligatory upon the
United States such as to create a cause of action pursuant to the
ATCA. Despite its ratification by the United States, there is no
indication that Geneva Convention IV manifests an intention to be
self-executing without the enactment of enabling legislation, the
United States intended such result at the time of ratification, or
that such a result is consistent with general- principles of
international human rights law. In any event, as previously
established, Geneva Convention IV has a very limited scope that
makes its application to transnational corporations unlikely.
Similar conclusions are reached through application of
regional and United Nations' human rights instruments. The right
to be free from summary execution as defined in the ACHR
suffers from the same problem as the ICCPR. Specifically, Article
4(1) merely prohibits arbitrary deprivations of life without
defining conduct constituting such deprivation.356 Furthermore, the
ACHR is not universal or obligatory.
The sole United Nations' instrument respecting summary
execution is also nonactionable pursuant to the ATCA. For one,
the specificity of the Principles on the Effective Prevention and
Investigation of Extra-Legal Arbitrary and Summary Execution
("the Principles") is questionable. The Principles place numerous
duties on states with respect to summary executions, including
prohibition, prevention and investigation. "' However, the
Principles do not provide a definition of "extra-legal, arbitrary and
summary execution." Even assuming the definition may be
ascertained from other international instruments or from the
prohibitions contained within the Principles themselves, the
universal nature of the Principles is subject to question given that
it constitutes nothing more than a resolution of the U.N. Economic
and Social Council, a far less globally representative institution
than the General Assembly. Thus, the Principles are due less
recognition as an expression of universal values than General
Assembly resolutions. In any event, regardless of their universal
356. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 160, art. 4(1) ("No one shall
be arbitrarily deprived of his life.").
357. Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary
and Summary Executions, E.S.C. Res. 1989/65, arts. 1-13, 1989 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. No. 1,
U.N. Doc. E/1989/89 (May 24, 1989).
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nature and widespread use of mandatory language, the Principles
are nonactionable declarations of aspirations and thus not
obligatory.
However, unlike the rights to security, life, and health, the
right to be free from summary execution has been identified as
part of the customary international law of human rights. Section
702 of the Restatement of Foreign Relations provides, in part, that a
state violates international law if, "as a matter of state policy, it
practices, encourages or condones . . . the murder . . . of
individuals.""35 State-sponsored murder of individuals is prohibited
to the extent it occurs "other than as lawful punishment pursuant
to conviction in accordance with due process of law, or as
necessary under customary law." '359 Freedom from such practices is
further defined as jus cogens, thereby rendering void international
agreements providing otherwise."
The designation of a customary standard of international
human rights as a peremptory norm does not necessarily render
it actionable pursuant to Justice Souter's opinion in Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain. Justice Souter refused to recognize Alvarez's
detention as an actionable violation of international human rights
law even though arbitrary detention has been defined as jus
cogens. " Although he attempted to distinguish Alvarez's
detention from jus cogens by holding that it was not "prolonged,"
Justice Souter further opined that, even assuming the detention to
be prolonged, it remained impossible for the Court to determine if
and when such detention achieved the degree of certainty
necessary to violate international law characteristic of traditional
offenses within the meaning of the ATCA such as piracy,
interference with ambassadors, and violation of safe conduct . As
such, Justice Souter refused to create a private cause of action
358. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF U.S. § 702(c) (1987).
359. Id. § 702 cmt. f.
360. Id. cmt. n.
361. A peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and
recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general
international law having the same character. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
362. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 737-38 (2004). Prolonged arbitrary
detention is defined as a peremptory norm in the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF U.S. § 702 cmt. n (1987).
363. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. at 737.
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pursuant to the ATCA for the violation of a norm considered
peremptory by the international community.
Justice Souter's reasoning is not directly applicable to the
peremptory norm existing with respect to summary or extrajudicial
execution for two reasons. First, the violations vary so widely as to
render Justice Souter's holding with respect to arbitrary detention
inapplicable to summary execution. Justice Souter may be correct
that the determination of when a detention becomes prolonged as
to violate international law renders it uncertain for purposes of
creating a private cause of action. 364
Such shades of gray are not present in a case of summary
execution, which consists of the absence or disregard of judicial
procedures and protections, including due process of law, followed
by the killing of a human being. Violations of this norm are far
easier to determine than what circumstances constitute prolonged
detention.
More importantly, unlike arbitrary detention, extrajudicial
killings are actionable pursuant to U.S. law.365 Specifically, the
TVPA provides civil liability for a person who "under actual or
apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation subjects
an individual to extrajudicial killing. '3 6  This statute empowers U.S.
courts to adjudicate such claims by U.S. citizens and aliens. The
TVPA has created "an unambiguous and modern basis for federal
claims of ... extrajudicial killing. 3 67 This express statutory basis
differentiates claims of extrajudicial killing from arbitrary
detention. Not only do claims of arbitrary detention lack an
express statutory basis, but they also lack specificity. By contrast,
claims of extrajudicial killing are defined within the TVPA as "a
deliberated killing not authorized by a previous judgment
pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the
judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by
civilized peoples." '366 As previously noted with respect to Geneva
Convention IV, although the definitions of "regularly constituted
364. Id.
365. U.S. law does not recognize a cause of action specifically enumerated as arbitrary
detention. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2000) (lifting tort immunity for federal investigative or
law enforcement officers only if a detention constitutes false imprisonment); see also 28
U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255 (establishing procedures for the issuance of writs of habeas corpus for
persons in the custody of the United States in violation of the U.S. Constitution).
366. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
367. H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 3 (1991).
368. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
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court" and "indispensable judicial guarantees" may be subject to
interpretation, the definition of extrajudicial killing in the TVPA is
identical to the internationally accepted definition.169 Furthermore,
the recognition of a federal cause of action for extrajudicial killing
gives this human rights violation an obligatory nature absent from
prolonged detention. Thus, unlike the rights to security, life, and
health, the right to be free from summary or extrajudicial killings
is specific, universal, and obligatory as to be actionable pursuant to
the ATCA.
6. Torture and Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment
The right to be free from torture and other cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment appears in thirteen international and regional
human rights instruments. The initial category of instruments
consists of four international conventions prohibiting torture and
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment but pertaining
primarily to other topics. The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights provides that "[n]o one shall be subjected to
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.""37 Article 37(a) of the CRC contains an identical
prohibition with respect to children."7 Geneva Convention IV
contains two prohibitions upon such treatment. Article 3(1)(a)
prohibits acts of torture and cruel treatment committed against
persons taking no part in hostilities by state parties during armed
conflicts not of an international character.372 Article 32 further
prohibits torture by state parties of such persons in their custody. 3
Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions prohibits torture and cruel
treatment of civilian populations during non-international armed
conflicts .3
The universal nature of these conventions is beyond question.
However, none of these conventions are actionable pursuant to
the ATCA for identical reasons. First, each of these conventions
lacks the requisite degree of specificity. Although each of these
conventions expressly prohibits torture and other cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment, none of the conventions defines the
369. Id.; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 262, art. 3(1)(d).
370. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 69, art. 7.
371. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 96, art. 37(a).
372. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 262, art. 3(1)(a).
373. Id. art. 32.
374. Protocol II, supra note 263, art. 4(2)(a)-(h).
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prohibited behaviors. Furthermore, none of these instruments are
obligatory upon the United States. The prohibitions contained in
the CRC and Protocol II are not legally binding due to the absence
of ratification by the United States.37 The prohibition contained
within the Civil and Political Rights Covenant is equally
nonobligatory as Article 7 has been declared to be non-self-
executing in the United States.176 Despite its ratification by the
United States, Geneva Convention IV is not obligatory as there is
no evidence it is self-executing or that such result was intended at
the time of ratification or is consistent with general principles of
international human rights law. The limited possibility of
application of Geneva Convention IV to the activities of
transnational corporations further minimizes its importance.
The second category of instruments relating to torture and
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment is those within the Inter-
American system of human rights.77 There are three instruments in
this classification. Article 5(2) of the American Convention on
Human Rights grants every person the right to be free from
torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment or
treatment. 378 Similarly, Article 4(d) of the Inter-American
Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of
Violence Against Women grants every woman the right to be free
from torture.17 9 The Inter-American human rights system also
contains a convention focused exclusively on torture. The Inter-
American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture obligates
states to take "effective measures" to prohibit and punish torture
occurring within their jurisdiction. 8
375. Elizabeth Burleson, Juvenile Execution, Terrorist Extradition, and Supreme Court
Discretion to Consider International Death Penalty Jurisprudence, 68 ALB. L. REV. 909,
915-16 (2005); see also 145 CONG. REC. S35-02, 1999 WL 3713 (statement of Pres. Clinton)
(stating Congress had not ratified Protocol II when President Reagan submitted it to the
Senate pursuant to its advise and consent role).
376. ICCPR CONG. REC., supra note 243, art. 3(1).
377. See American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 160; ICPPEVW, supra
note 246; Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture art. 6, 25 I.L.M. 519
(Dec. 9, 1985) [hereinafter IACPPT], available at
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Treaties/a-51.html.
378. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 160, art. 5(2) ("No one shall
be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment.").
379. ICPPEVW, supra note 246, art. 4(d) ("Every woman has the right ... not to be
subjected to torture.").
380. IACPPT, supra note 377, art. 6.
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None of these conventions may serve as the basis for
jurisdiction pursuant to the ATCA.3 1' The American Conventions
on Human Rights and the Prevention, Punishment and
Eradication of Violence Against Women suffer from three
shortcomings. Initially, these conventions merely prohibit torture
and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment without defining the
prohibited practices. Second, neither of these conventions is
universal. The absence of U.S. ratification of these instruments
renders their prohibitions upon torture and cruel, inhuman or
degrading punishment or treatment nonobligatory.
By contrast, the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and
Punish Torture does not suffer from a lack of specificity. The
Convention defines torture as "any act intentionally performed
whereby physical or mental pain or suffering is inflicted on a
person for purposes of criminal investigation, as a means of
intimidation, as personal punishment, as a preventive measure, as
a penalty, or for any other purpose. '3.2 This definition includes
methods utilized to "obliterate the personality of the victim or to
diminish his physical or mental capacities, even if they do not
cause physical pain or mental anguish."3 ' States are required to
prevent the occurrence of torture through the criminalization of
such conduct in their national law." Further specificity is found in
provisions identifying those persons to whom this prohibition is
applicable3.5 and eliminating circumstances under which such
conduct may be justified.'8
However, despite this high degree of specificity, the Inter-
American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture is incapable
of serving as a basis for private civil litigation in the United States.
The universal nature of the Inter-American Torture Convention
may be challenged due to the absence of ratification by the United
381. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732
(2004) (citing In re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th
Cir. 1994)) (stating that for a violation of international law to be actionable, the norm
must be specific, universal and obligatory).
382. IACPPT, supra note 377, art. 2.
383. Id.
384. Id. art. 6.
385. Id. art. 3(a)-(b) (prohibiting torture conducted by public servants or employees or
those acting at their instigation).
386. Id. art. 5 (prohibiting justification for torture due to the existence of a state of
war, siege, emergency, domestic disturbance or strife, suspension of constitutional
guarantees, political instability or other disasters).
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States and Canada.87 The absence of U.S. ratification or accession
also renders the Convention's prohibitions upon torture
nonobligatory.
The third category of instruments relating to torture and
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment consists of five resolutions
of the U.N. General Assembly." The oldest of these instruments,
the UDHR, provides that "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture
or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." '389 By
comparison, three of the declarations relate to specific
circumstances in which torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment may occur. The Declaration on the
Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed
Conflict calls upon states to abide by their obligations pursuant to
the Geneva Conventions, including efforts to spare women and
children from torture and degrading treatment in the course of
military operations and criminal prosecution of persons engaging
in acts of torture.9° The Declaration on the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearances notes the connection
between acts of enforced disappearance and violations of the right
to be free from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment."' Torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment is also prohibited by Article 3(h) of the
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women. 2
Assuming these declarations represent universal consensus as
expressed in the collective judgment of the U.N. General
387. The Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture had been ratified
or acceded to by sixteen states at the time of preparation of this article. Org. of American
States, Status of Ratification of the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish
Torture 1-2 (2004), http://www.oas.org/juridico/English/Sigs/a-51.html (last visited Mar. 12,
2006). In addition to the United States and Canada, the Convention was not in force and
effect in Jamaica, among other nations. Id.
388. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 97; Declaration on the
Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict, G.A. Res. 3318,
U.N. GAOR 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (Dec. 14, 1974); Declaration on
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances, supra note 253; Declaration
on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, supra note 253.
389. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 97, art. 5.
390. Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed
Conflict, supra note 388, arts. 3-5.
391. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances,
supra note 253, art. 1(2).
392. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, supra note 253, art.
3(h) (providing women are entitled "not to be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment").
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Assembly, they still may not serve as the basis for jurisdiction
pursuant to the ATCA. Each of these declarations suffers from a
lack of specificity due to their failure to define conduct within their
collective prohibitions. Regardless of their universal nature and
use of mandatory language prohibiting torture in general or under
specific circumstances, these declarations are nonactionable
statements of aspirations and thus not obligatory.
The General Assembly addressed this topic directly in the
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subject
to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment. In contrast to the previously referenced declarations,
this Declaration does not suffer from a lack of specificity with
respect to torture.393 Torture is defined as the infliction of severe
physical or mental pain or suffering intentionally inflicted by or at
the instigation of a public official for purposes of obtaining
information, confession to a crime or as a form of punishment or
intimidation."9 The Declaration condemns all such acts as a
violation of the UDHR and prohibits states from permitting or
tolerating their occurrence.9 States are required to undertake
"effective measures" to prevent such acts from being practiced
within their jurisdiction. 6 Further specificity is found in the
elimination of circumstances justifying such practices including war
or threat thereof, internal political instability and other public
emergencies. 7 Nevertheless, the Declaration on the Protection of
All Persons from Being Subject to Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment is a
nonactionable statement of aspirations.
The final instrument relating to the right to be free from
torture is the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment."' This instrument is the most
393. By contrast, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is not defined
in the Declaration and lacks the requisite degree of specificity for purposes of
enforcement pursuant to the ATCA.
394. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, G.A. Res. 3452, art. 1(1), U.N.
GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, U.N. Doc. A11034 (Dec. 9, 1975).
395. Id. arts. 2, 3.
396. Id. art. 4.
397. Id. art. 3.
398. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, G.A. Res. 46, art. 1, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc.
A[RES/39/46, (Dec. 10, 1984) [hereinafter Convention Against Torture], available at
http://www.un.org.documents/ga/res/39/a39rO46.htm.
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widely recognized human rights convention relating to torture and
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and punishment having
been ratified or acceded to by 136 states at the time of preparation
of this article.399 The Convention sets forth a definition of torture
similar to that contained in the previously discussed Torture
Declaration. '  States are required to undertake "effective
legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent
acts of torture in any territory under [their] jurisdiction., 411 In this
regard, each state is to ensure torture is an offense punishable
pursuant to its criminal laws. 2 National laws must further provide
for civil redress for torture victims, including "an enforceable right
to fair and adequate compensation" and "means for as full
rehabilitation as possible. 4 3 No exceptions to these prohibitions
are permitted.4" The Convention does not define cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment. Nevertheless, states are
obligated to undertake measures to prevent such conduct when it
is "committed by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an
official capacity."4 5 It may be concluded from this language that
the Torture Convention is specific, universal and obligatory, at
least with respect to practices constituting torture. However, the
Convention is rendered nonobligatory as a result of its ratification
by the United States. Although the United States ratified the
Torture Convention effective October 1994, the substantive
provisions of the Convention were declared to be non-self-
399. Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties,
supra note 241, at 12.
400. Convention Against Torture, supra note 398, art. 1. Torture is defined as:
[Alny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a
third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any
kind, when such pain and suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with
the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an
official capacity.
Id.
401. Id. art. 2(1).
402. Id. art. 4(1).
403. Id. art. 14(1).
404. Id. art. 2(2) (prohibiting exceptions for war or the threat thereof, political
instability or other public emergency).
405. Id. art. 16(1).
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executing. 6 As such, the Torture Convention on its face is not
actionable pursuant to the ATCA.
However, in a manner similar to the right to be free from
summary execution, the right to be free from torture and cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment has been
identified as part of the customary international law of human
rights pursuant to Section 702 of the Restatement of Foreign
Relations.47 Torture as a norm of customary international law as
defined by the Restatement is identical to the U.N. General
Assembly's Torture Declaration..4 " Freedom from such practices is
further defined as jus cogens, thereby rendering void international
agreements providing otherwise.'
As previously noted with respect to summary execution, the
designation of a customary standard of international human rights
as a peremptory norm does not necessarily render it actionable
pursuant to Justice Souter's opinion in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.4 °
However, Justice Souter's reasoning is not applicable in this
circumstance as torture is actionable pursuant to U.S. law.4 ' The
TVPA provides civil liability for a person who "under actual or
apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation subjects
an individual to torture. '4 12 In a manner identical to summary
execution, this express statutory basis differentiates claims of
torture from arbitrary detention. Not only does arbitrary detention
lack an express statutory basis, but it also lacks specificity.
By contrast, torture is defined within the Act as the
intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether physical
or mental, against a person in the offender's custody or physical
control for the purpose of obtaining information or a confession
from the victim or a third person, inflicting punishment for an act
committed or allegedly committed by the victim or third person,
406. U.S. Reservations, Declarations and Understandings, Convention Against
Torture, art. 3(1).
407. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF U.S. § 702(d) (1987)
("A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages
or condones.., torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.").
408. Id. cmt. g.
409. Id. cmt. n.
410. See generally Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004) (stating that a
claim based on international law must be based on a norm of international character with
sufficient specificity to be actionable).
411. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) (enacting protections for the victims of torture at the




intimidating or coercing the victim or a third person or for any
discriminatory reason not otherwise provided.... "Mental pain or
suffering" is defined in the Act as prolonged mental harm caused
by or resulting from the intentional infliction or threatened
infliction of severe physical pain or suffering, the administration or
application or threatened administration or application of mind
altering substances or other procedures calculated to profoundly
disrupt the senses or personality, threats of imminent death or
similar threats directed at a third person. '14 Although the meaning
of some terms within the Act, such as "severe" and "prolonged"
pain and suffering, are subject to reasonable disagreement, the
definition of torture in the TVPA is identical to the definition
contained within the U.S. reservations, declarations and
understandings with respect to the Torture Convention. 415
Additionally, the recognition of a federal cause of action for
torture gives this human rights violation an obligatory nature
absent from other violations such as prolonged detention. Thus,
the right to be free from torture is specific, universal and
obligatory as to be actionable pursuant to the ATCA.
Justice Souter's reasoning also is not directly applicable to the
peremptory norm existing with respect to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment. In its statement of
reservations, declarations and understandings with respect to the
Torture Convention, the United States noted that cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment as utilized in the
Convention means such punishment as is prohibited by the Fifth,
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. The U.S. Reservations, Declarations and Understandings with respect to the
Torture Convention define torture as an act:
[S]pecifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering and
that mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental harm caused by or
resulting from: (1) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe
physical pain or suffering; (2) the administration or application, or threatened
administration or application, of mind altering substances or other procedures
calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality; (3) the threat of
imminent death; or (4) the threat that another person will imminently be
subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or
application of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt
profoundly the senses or personality.
U.S. Reservations, Declarations and Understandings, Convention Against Torture, art.
2(1)(a). This definition is qualified by the requirement the acts be directed against persons
in the offender's custody or physical control. Id.
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Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.4 6
As a result, the absence of a definition of cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment in the Torture Convention is
of minimal importance. Although offending conduct is subject to
reasonable disagreement, its meaning is nevertheless ascertainable
from judicial opinions defining cruel, unusual and inhumane
treatment pursuant to the U.S. Constitution. Given the
equivalence between these definitions, it is tempting to conclude
instances of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
are actionable pursuant to Title 42 of the U.S. Code, which
provides for civil liability for every person who, under color of law,
deprives any U.S. citizen or other person within the jurisdiction of
any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution.4 "
However, the civil liability provided by Title 42 is limited to U.S.
citizens or other persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States . Aliens outside the jurisdictional reach of the U.S. legal
system are thus excluded from this group of potential plaintiffs.419
This lack of an express statutory basis for claims available to all
persons differentiates cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment from torture. Thus, the right to be free from cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is specific and
universal but not obligatory as to be actionable pursuant to the
ATCA.
B. Human Rights Associated with Personal Freedom
1. Liberty
The right to liberty appears in eight treaties, conventions, and
declarations. These instruments include two global conventions,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child. The Civil and Political
Rights Covenant provides "[e]veryone has the right to liberty of
person' 4 . Article 37(b) of the Convention on the Rights of the
Child prohibits states from depriving children of their liberty in an
416. Id. art. 1(2).
417. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (stating that any person who under color of law causes a
citizen or person within the jurisdiction of the U.S. to be deprived of constitutional and/or
statutory rights shall be subject to civil liability).
418. Id.
419. Id.
420. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 69, art. 9(1).
460 [Vol. 28:393
Lohengrin Revealed
unlawful or arbitrary manner.2' As previously noted, the universal
nature of these conventions is beyond question. However, neither
of these conventions is actionable due to the absence of specificity
and their nonobligatory nature. Although both conventions
recognize the right to liberty and the CRC prevents states from
unlawfully and arbitrarily depriving children of such right, neither
convention defines what is meant by the term "liberty."
Furthermore, the CRC has not been ratified by the United States,
and U.S. ratification of the Civil and Political Rights Covenant was
with the express reservation that Article 9 be non-self-executing.422
The right to liberty also is recognized within the Inter-
American system of human rights. The American Declaration of
the Rights and Duties of Man, the founding document of the Inter-
American human rights system, recognizes that "[e]very human
being has the right to ... liberty. 4 '23 Article 7(1) of the American
Convention on Human Rights grants every person the right to
personal liberty.424 This right is not subject to deprivation "except
for the reasons and under the conditions established beforehand
by the constitution of the State Party concerned or by a law
established pursuant thereto.,125 Similarly, Article 4(c) of the Inter-
American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and
Eradication of Violence Against Women grants every woman the
right to personal liberty.26
None of these instruments however may serve as the basis for
jurisdiction pursuant to the ATCA. The American Conventions on
Human Rights and the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of
Violence Against Women suffer from three shortcomings in this
regard. Initially, in an identical manner to global conventions
recognizing the right to liberty, the American Conventions on
Human Rights and the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of
Violence Against Women merely recognize the right to liberty
421. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 96, art. 37(b).
422. Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties,
supra note 241, at 11; see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 728 (2004) (stating
that when the Senate ratified the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, it
declared that the substantive provisions of the document were not self-executing); Alfred
de Zayas, Human Rights Implications of the Demjanjuk Case, ISBA GLOBE, Jan. 1994,
reprinted in 140 CONG. REC. E1211-06 (1994), 1994 WL 261644.
423. American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, supra note 97, art. 1.
424. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 160, art. 7(1).
425. Id. art. 7(2).
426. ICPPEVW, supra note 246, art. 4(c) ("Every woman has the right to... personal
liberty.").
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without defining the attributes of this right. 2 ' The ACHR does
attempt to define those behaviors deemed to be in violation of the
right to personal liberty, but this effort fails as it is difficult to
determine whether an act is violating a given right without first
defining the right. In addition, Article 7(2) of the ACHR permits
interference with this undefined right if such interference is
consistent with a national constitution or laws adopted pursuant
thereto.428 Such unfettered discretion granted to states does not
serve to render the right to personal liberty any more specific. Any
corresponding effort to define conduct in violation of the right to
personal liberty is absent from the Convention on the Prevention,
Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women.
Furthermore, as previously noted, neither of these conventions
may be deemed universal. The specific absence of U.S. ratification
of these instruments renders their recognition of personal liberty
nonobligatory.
In contrast, the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man defines the right to liberty as the ability "to move
about freely within [the territory of the state in which he is a
national]." 429 However, Article VIII fails to define the
circumstances pursuant to which states may legitimately restrict
the exercise of the right to personal liberty. Further undefined are
those instances rendering such restrictions illegitimate. This wide
discretion residing in states to determine the bounds of the right to
personal liberty thus renders it nonspecific. Furthermore, although
the American Declaration may be universal as one of the founding
instruments of the OAS, it is a declaration of goals and aspirations
rather than a mandatory body of standards enforceable upon
states in a court of law.
Three resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly specifically
reference the right to liberty. Initial recognition of the right to
liberty occurred in the UDHR, which provides that "[elveryone
has the right to ...liberty.. 3. The right of women to liberty is
recognized in Article 3(c) of the Declaration on the Elimination of
Violence Against Women. '31 Neither of these declarations
427. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 160, art. 7(1).
428. Id. art. 7(2).
429. American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, supra note 97, art. 8.
430. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 97, art. 3.
431. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, supra note 253, art.
3(c) ("Women are entitled.., to the right to liberty.").
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establishes the attributes of this right nor elaborates upon conduct
deemed to be in violation thereof. The final declaration relates to
specific circumstances in which personal liberty may be violated.
The Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance provides that such practice violates the "liberty...
of the person. '41 2 However, like the previous declarations, the
Declaration on Enforced Disappearance also fails to establish the
attributes of the right to liberty. Furthermore, the Declaration
does not define the term "enforced disappearance" which violates
the right to liberty. As such, this declaration cannot be
characterized as possessing the requisite degree of specificity as to
be actionable pursuant to the ATCA. Furthermore, although each
of these three resolutions may be characterized as universal given
their adoption by the United Nations General Assembly, they are
nonactionable statements of aspirations.
2. Enforced Disappearance
Related to the right to liberty is the right to be free from
enforced disappearance. This right initially appeared in the
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1992.' 3
The Declaration generally notes acts of enforced disappearance
are offenses to human dignity, violations of the right to liberty and
security, may result in torture or other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment, and pose a grave threat to the
right to life.434 Despite this generality, the Declaration contains
several specific provisions. For example, the Declaration requires
states to adopt "effective legislative, administrative, judicial or
other measures to prevent and terminate acts of enforced
disappearance." 411 States are to achieve this goal through
criminalization of acts of enforced disappearance 43 6 and providing
for civil liability for perpetrators and state authorities on whose
behalf they have acted.4 7 Furthermore, public authorities and their
432. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances,
supra note 253, art. 1(2).
433. Id. art. 2(1) (prohibiting states from practicing, permitting or tolerating acts of
enforced disappearance).
434. Id. art. 1(2).
435. Id. art. 3.
436. Id. art. 4(1).
437. Id. art. 5.
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agents are prohibited from ordering disappearances, 438 and no
circumstances, including war or the threat thereof, political
instability or other public emergency, may be used as justification
for such practice.439 Detainees are required to be held at an
"officially recognized place of detention," and states are to
maintain accurate information on their location,440 including
reliable means by which their release may be verified."' Victims of
detentions failing to conform to these requirements and their
families shall have the right to obtain adequate compensation for
all losses proximately resulting from the detention.4 Nevertheless,
the Declaration does not provide a context within which these
rights and duties are to be effective by failing to define the term
"enforced disappearance." Furthermore, the Declaration is
nonobligatory as a General Assembly resolution lacking national
legal effect.
The standards set forth in the Declaration on the Protection
of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances have been adopted
in a legally binding format in the Inter-American Convention on
Forced Disappearance of Persons."3 This Convention requires
states to "undertake not toXractice, permit or tolerate the forced
disappearance of persons" and provide for the punishment of
such acts in their national criminal codes." The Convention also
tracks other requirements of the Declaration. For example, Article
VIII prohibits public authorities and their agents from ordering
disappearances. In a manner similar to Article 7 of the
Declaration, Article X of the Convention provides that no
circumstances may be used as justification for disappearances.
States are similarly required to hold detainees in an "officially
recognized place of detention" and account for all such persons to
438. Id. art. 6(1).
439. Id. art. 7.
440. Id. art. 10.
441. Id. art. 11.
442. Id. art. 19.
443. Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons art. 1(a)-(d),
June 9, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1429 (imposing a duty upon states to prohibit forced disappearance
of persons and punish such acts occurring within their jurisdiction).
444. Id. art. 1(a).
445. Id. art. 3.
446. Id. art. 8.
447. Id. art. 10 (prohibiting war or the threat thereof, political instability or other
public emergency as justifications for enforced disappearance).
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family." Most importantly, unlike the Declaration, the Convention
provides a context within which these rights and duties attach by
defining forced disappearances." This definition is very specific,
identifying the required acts and perpetrators and describing the
injury caused as a result thereof. However, the Convention lacks
universal support as evidenced by its ratification by less than half
of the members of the Inter-American human rights system."5 The
Convention also is not obligatory given the absence of ratification
by the United States."5'
The right to be free from enforced disappearance is also part
of the customary international law of human rights. "52 The
Restatement further defines this freedom as jus cogens. "'
Nevertheless, Justice Souter's refusal to create a private cause of
action pursuant to the ATCA for violation of the right to be free
from arbitrary detention, a norm that is considered peremptory by
the international community, is applicable to the norm existing
with respect to enforced disappearance.
The specificity of enforced disappearance renders Justice
Souter's holding with respect to the lack of specificity of arbitrary
detention inapplicable. Although the determination of what
constitutes a prolonged detention as to violate international law
renders it uncertain for purposes of creating a private cause of
action, there is no such uncertainty with respect to enforced
disappearance. As defined by the Inter-American Convention,
448. Id. art. 11.
449. Forced disappearance is defined as:
[T]he act of depriving a person or persons of their freedom, in whatever way,
perpetrated by agents of the state or by persons or groups of persons acting with
the authorization, support, or acquiescence of the state, followed by an absence
of information or a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to
give information on the whereabouts of that person, thereby impeding his or her
recourse to the applicable legal remedies and procedural guarantees.
Id. art. 2.
450. Org. of American States, Status of Ratification of the Inter-American Convention
on Forced Disappearance of Persons 1-2 (2004). At the time of preparation of this article,
the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance had been ratified by Argentina,
Bolivia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and
Venezuela. Id.
451. Id.
452. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF U.S. § 702(c)
(1987) (providing a state violates international law if, "as a matter of state policy, it
practices, encourages or condones.., the disappearance of individuals").
453. Id. cmt. n.
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enforced disappearance consists of four elements.4 There are two
required acts, the deprivation of a person's freedom and the
absence of information or refusal to acknowledge such
deprivation .4 " The perpetrators must be agents of the state or
persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization,
support, or acquiescence of the state.416 Finally, these acts must
result in impediment of recourse to applicable procedural
protections and legal remedies.457 Violations of this norm are thus
far easier to determine than those alleging prolonged detention.
However, although U.S. law recognizes the liability of federal
investigative and law enforcement officers for false imprisonment,
there is no recognized cause of action in the United States for
enforced disappearance. 4" The most similar proceeding to
enforced disappearance recognized in the United States is the
habeas corpus proceeding in which an individual challenges his or
her detention. 4" However, habeas corpus only determines the
lawfulness of the detention. The very filing of the habeas corpus
petition belies the element of enforced disappearance requiring
the refusal to provide information to the detainee. The filing of
such petition also prevents the occurrence of the required element
of injury, specifically, the impediment of recourse to applicable
procedural protections and legal remedies. Thus, although specific,
the right to be free from forced disappearance is not actionable
pursuant to the ATCA.
3. Arbitrary Detention
The right to be free from arbitrary or unlawful arrest is
recognized in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.460 Unlike its recognition of the right to liberty, the Civil and
Political Rights Covenant defines the right to be free from
arbitrary arrest and detention and places specific duties upon
states. Specifically, arrests and detentions must be in accordance





458. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2000).
459. See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255 (2000).
460. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 69, art. 9(1) ("No
one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.").
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with national law.46 ' This requires states to adopt procedural
protections for detainees, including notice of the grounds for
detention at the time of the arrest and prompt notice of charges
46
thereafter. 62 Detainees are required to be brought before a
magistrate in a prompt manner and are further entitled to a trial
within a reasonable time.64 Such persons are generally subject to
release pending trial, although release may be contingent on
guarantees for appearance at subsequent proceedings. 4' Detainees
are entitled to challenge the lawfulness of their detention,65 and
victims of detentions deemed unlawful are to be provided with "an
enforceable right to compensation." 466 Although the
implementation of these rights is left to the discretion of national
governments, their parameters are definite enough to be
considered specific for purposes of the ATCA. However, the
ICCPR is not actionable due to the U.S. reservation that Article 9
is not self-executing.
The right to be free from arbitrary or unlawful arrest is
extended to children by the Convention CRC, which requires any
arrest, detention or imprisonment of a child "be in conformity with
the law and shall be used only as a measure of last resort and for
the shortest appropriate period of time., 467 The rights extended to
children with respect to their detention are not as specific as those
set forth in the ICCPR. Undoubtedly, the right of detained
children to "prompt access" to legal assistance, the right to
challenge their detention before an appropriate court or other
"independent and impartial authority" and receive a "prompt
decision" create readily definable duties for states.4M8 However,
other rights granted to detained children are vague and defy
universal meaning. For example, it is unclear what is required in
order to treat children "with humanity and respect for the inherent
dignity of the human person" or in a manner taking into account
"the needs of persons of his or her age."469 Equally vague is the
state's discretion to sever contact between the child and his or her
461. Id.
462. Id. art. 9(2).
463. Id. art. 9(3).
464. Id.
465. Id. art. 9(4).
466. Id. art. 9(5).
467. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 96, art. 37(b).
468. Id. art. 37(d).
469. Id. art. 37(c).
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family if such contact is not in the child's "best interest" or for
other "exceptional circumstances. 4 70 The Convention offers no
elaboration on the meaning of these terms or how states may
satisfy their obligations. As a result, only a portion of the rights
accruing to detained children pursuant to the CRC are specific
enough as to be enforceable in a court of law. In any event, the
CRC is not actionable pursuant to the ATCA due to the absence
of U.S. ratification.
The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,
one of its implementing instruments, the ACHR, and the UDHR
cast little new light on the rights of detainees. The American
Declaration and the ACHR prohibit detentions other than as that
occur pursuant to national constitutions or laws,47' although only
the ACHR characterizes detentions contrary thereto to be
"arbitrary., 472 In a manner similar to the ICCPR, the ACHR
requires arrestees to be advised of the basis for their detention as
well as prompt notice of charges if filed. '73 The American
Declaration and the ACHR further entitle detainees to challenge
the legality of their detention and proceed to trial without
unreasonable delay.44 The ACHR also adopts language within the
ICCPR with respect to pretrial release upon the provision of
security.45 These rights are specific to the extent they are similar or
identical to those set forth in the ICCPR and CRC. By contrast,
the UDHR is nonspecific as it merely establishes the right to be
free from arbitrary arrest and detention without further
elaboration. 476 In any event, the UDHR and American
Declarations are nonobligatory statements of aspirations, and the
American Convention is not universal or obligatory.
470. Id.
471. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 160, art. 7(2) ("No one shall
be deprived of his physical liberty except for the reasons and under the conditions
established beforehand by the constitution of the State Party concerned or by a law
established pursuant thereto."); American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man,
supra note 97, art. 25 (stating "[n]o person shall be deprived of his liberty except in the
cases and according to the procedures established by pre-existing law" and all such
persons shall be entitled to a hearing to determine the legality of their detention).
472. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 160, art. 7(3).
473. Id. art. 7(4).
474. Id. art. 7(5); American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, supra note
97, art. 25.
475. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 160, art. 7(5).
476. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 97, art. 9 ("No one shall be
subjected to arbitrary arrest [or] detention.").
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The right to be free from arbitrary detention has been
identified as part of the customary international law of human
rights.477 The detention must be prolonged and practiced as state
policy in order to violate customary international law."8 Freedom
from such practices is further defined as jus cogens."7' However,
Justice Souter refused to recognize Alvarez's detention as an
actionable violation of international human rights law despite its
apparent jus cogens status. 'Although he attempted to distinguish
Alvarez's detention on the basis it was not "prolonged," Justice
Souter also held that, even assuming the detention to be
prolonged, it remained impossible for the Court to determine if
and when such detention achieved the degree of certainty
necessary to violate international law characteristic of offenses
traditionally within the meaning of the ATCA."'8 As a result,
Justice Souter refused to create a private cause of action pursuant
to the ATCA for the violation of a norm considered peremptory
by the international community. Given this holding and the
absence of recognition of such claims pursuant to applicable
statutory law, arbitrary detention, regardless of its prolonged
nature, is not actionable pursuant to the ATCA.82
C. Human Rights Associated with Perceived Status
1. Genocide
Two human rights instruments reference the right to be free
from genocide. Initially, Article 6 of the elements of crimes as
established by the International Criminal Court defines genocide
as consisting of one of six specific acts. These acts include killing,
causing serious bodily or mental harm, deliberately inflicting
conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction,
imposing measures to prevent births, and forcibly transferring
children."' There are three common elements to these acts. First,
477. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF U.S. § 702(e) (1987)
(providing a state violates international law if, "as a matter of state policy, it practices,
encourages or condones... prolonged arbitrary detention").
478. Id. cmt. h.
479. Id. cmt. n.
480. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 756-57 (2004).
481. Id. at 757.
482. See sources cited supra note 365.
483. Int'l Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2, art.
6(a)-(e) (May 8, 2000).
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the victim must be a member of "a particular national, ethnical,
racial or religious group.""' Second, the perpetrator's intent in
engaging in the conduct must be to "destroy, in whole or in part" a
particular group.' Finally, the conduct must occur in the context
of "a manifest pattern of similar conduct directed against that
group or that could itself effect such destruction."'
The definitions of genocide to be enforced by the
International Criminal Court establish the necessary conduct, the
intent of the perpetrator, the identity of the victim and the context
in which such conduct occurs. In this regard, these definitions are
among the most well-defined in international human rights law.
Such specificity is essential given the intended purpose of the
definitions to serve as the basis for criminal prosecution. As these
definitions meet the requirements of due process with respect to
providing notice of criminal conduct, they also possess the
necessary degree of specificity in order to be actionable pursuant
to the ATCA.
However, the universal and obligatory nature of the
documents establishing the International Criminal Court is subject
to question. The instrument establishing the International
Criminal Court, the Rome Statute, had 139 signatories at the time
of the preparation of this Article.' However, only ninety-seven
states, approximately one-half of the international community,
have ratified or acceded to the Statute.' Although significant, the
ratification or accession by only half of the global community
raises serious questions with respect to the universal recognition of
the Court as well as the principles for which it stands. This includes
the definition of various crimes subject to the Court's jurisdiction,
including genocide. Even assuming the Rome Statute and
International Criminal Court have been universally recognized,
the Statute is not obligatory on the United States due to the
absence of ratification.' 9
484. Id. arts. 6(a)(2), (b)(2), (c)(2), (d)(2), (e)(2).
485. Id. arts. 6(a)(3), (b)(3), (c)(3), (d)(3), (e)(3).
486. Id. arts. 6(a)(4), (b)(4), (c)(5), (d)(5), (e)(7).
487. United Nations, Ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court 1 (2004). The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was adopted on
July 17, 1998 by the U.N. Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court. See id.
488. Id. at 1.
489. Id. at 6. The United States signed the Rome Statute on December 31, 2000 but
has not ratified its obligations or acceded to its terms.
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The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide presents a more viable basis for a civil action
pursuant to the ATCA. The Convention provides that genocide,
whether occurring in time of peace or war, is a crime under
international law. 9' Conduct associated with genocide also is
punishable as a crime, including conspiracy or direct and public
incitement to commit genocide and attempts to commit or
complicity in genocide.49' The Convention defines genocide as
consisting of three specific elements. The perpetrator must first
engage in a specific act. For purposes of the Convention, this act
consists of killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm,
deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about
physical destruction of a particular group of people, measures
designed to prevent births, and the forcible transfer of children. '92
The second element is the perpetrator's intent in committing these
acts, specifically, the "intent to destroy, in whole or in part" a
particular group of people. "3 The final element of the offense is the
identity of the victims. In order to constitute genocide, the
perpetrator's conduct must be directed at "a national, ethnical,
racial or religious group. ' " ' Persons committing such acts are
subject to punishment regardless of their status as "constitutionally
responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals." States
are required to adopt necessary legislation to implement the
Convention with specific emphasis upon providing "effective
penalties" for persons found guilty of genocide or genocide-related
conduct. '96 These penalties are to be assessed after a trial by a
tribunal in the state where the offense was committed or an
international penal tribunal."
In a manner identical to the Statute of the International
Criminal Court, the definitions of genocide set forth in the
Convention establish the necessary conduct, the intent of the
perpetrator, the identity of the victim, and the context in which
490. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 1,
Jan. 12, 1951, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
491. Id. art. 3(a)-(e).
492. Id. art. 2(a)-(e).
493. Id. art. 2.
494. Id.
495. Id. art. 4.
496. Id. art. 5.
497. Id. art. 6.
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such conduct occurs.498 To the extent these definitions are identical
to those -in the Statute of the International Criminal Court, they
possess the necessary degree of specificity in order to be
actionable pursuant to the ATCA. However, unlike the Rome
Statute, the Genocide Convention is universal given its ratification
or accession by 136 states at the time of the preparation of this
Article.' 9 The United States is one of these parties, having signed
the Convention in December 1948 and ratified it in November
1988."o
The more significant issue is whether the Genocide
Convention is obligatory on the United States as to serve as the
basis for a private civil action pursuant to the ATCA. In addition,
it bears to note that genocide is part of the customary international
law of human rights.5" This prohibition is further defined as jus
cogens. ° Despite this recognition, genocide cannot serve as the
basis for a private cause of action pursuant to the ATCA.
The specificity of genocide renders Justice Souter's holding in
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain with respect to the lack of definiteness of
prohibited conduct inapplicable. However, there is no recognized
private cause of action for genocide pursuant to applicable U.S.
law. °3 The Genocide Convention only requires states to adopt
legislation defining genocide and genocide-related acts and
procedures by which perpetrators may be charged, tried, and
punished. " The definitions of genocide contained in the
Convention have their origin in criminal law. 5 This includes the
terms "conspiracy," "incitement," "attempt," and "complicity.""
Other phraseology of the Convention is criminal in its intent and
scope with utilization of such terms as "charges" and procedures
for assessing and punishing persons adjudicated "guilty" of
498. Id. art 2.
499. United Nations, Ratification of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1 (2004).
500. Id. at 5.
501. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF U.S. § 702(a) (1987)
(providing a state violates international law if, "as a matter of state policy, it practices,
encourages or condones genocide").
502. Id. cmt. n.
503. 18 U.S.C. § 1092 (2000).
504. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra
note 490, art. 5.
505. See id. arts. 3, 5, 6.
506. Id. art. 3(a)-(e).
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genocide.07 It may be concluded that the Genocide Convention
only requires states to criminalize acts of genocide. The express
language of the Convention does not require states to provide for
civil liability for such acts in their national laws.
The United States recognized this distinction in legislation
implementing the Genocide Convention. The Genocide
Convention Implementation Act was placed in Title 18 relating to
federal criminal offenses. 508 Genocide, attempts to commit
genocide, and direct and public incitement to commit genocide are
described as "basic offenses.""' These basic offenses are subject to
criminal punishment, including imprisonment and fines. 510
Jurisdiction of U.S. courts is limited to "offenses" committed
507. Id. arts. 5, 6.
508. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1091-1093 (2000).
509. Genocide and attempt to commit genocide are defined as:
Whoever, whether in time of peace or in time of war ... with the specific intent
to destroy, in whole or in substantial part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious
group as such -
(1) kills members of that group;
(2) causes serious bodily injury to members of that group;
(3) causes the permanent impairment of the mental faculties of members of the
group through drugs, torture, or similar techniques;
(4) subjects the group to conditions of life that are intended to cause the physical
destruction of the group in whole or in part;
(5) imposes measures intended to prevent births within the group; or
(6) transfers by force children of the group to another group;
or attempts to do so, shall be punished....
Id. § 1091 (a).
The term "national group" is defined as "a set of individuals whose identity as such is
distinctive in terms of nationality or national origins." Id. § 1093(5). "Ethnic groups" are
defined as "a set of individuals whose identity as such is distinctive in terms of common
cultural traditions or heritage." Id. § 1093(2). "Racial groups" and "religious groups" are
similarly defined to include sets of individuals distinctive in terms of "physical
characteristics or biological descent" in the case of race and "common religious creed,
beliefs, doctrines, practices or rituals" in the case of religion. Id. § 1093(6), (7).
"Substantial part" is defined as "a part of a group of such numerical significance that the
destruction or loss of that part would cause the destruction of the group as a viable entity
within the nation of which such group is a part." Id. § 1093(8). Incitement is defined as
"urg[ing] another to engage imminently in conduct in circumstances under which there is a
substantial likelihood of imminently causing such conduct." Id. § 1093(3). Incitement is
punishable by a fine of no more than $500,000 or imprisonment for no more than five
years or both. Id. § 1091(c).
510. Punishment for an act of genocide involving the killing of members of a group is
death or imprisonment for life and a fine of not more than $ 1 million or both. Id. §
1091(b)(1). All other offenses except incitement are punishable by a fine of not more than
$1 million or imprisonment for twenty years or both. Id. § 1091(b)(2). By contrast,
incitement is punishable by a fine of no more than $500,000 or imprisonment for no more
than five years or both. Id. § 1091(c).
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within the United States or in instances when the "alleged
offender" is a U.S. national."' Most importantly, the Act's
provisions are not to "be construed as creating any substantive or
procedural right enforceable by law by any party in any
proceeding.512 The implication from this language is that the scope
of the Genocide Convention Implementation Act is limited to the
Convention's express requirements, the criminalization of
genocide and genocide-related conduct, and its effective
prosecution and punishment.
Unlike arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance, states
possess universal jurisdiction to define and punish genocide."
Other offenses included on this list are aircraft hijacking, slave
trading, war crimes and, most importantly, piracy."' As Justice
Souter deemed piracy to be one of the offenses originally intended
to be within the scope of the ATCA, it is tempting to conclude its
equation to genocide as an offense of universal concern confers
the same status on genocide. However, this leap of logic fails since,
despite genocide's universal status, there must still be a basis for
the initiation and prosecution of a private civil action through
appropriate provisions within national law. Universal jurisdiction
has been traditionally exercised in the form of criminal
prosecution." Although universal jurisdiction and its traditional
exercise do not preclude the application of civil law, the state must
nonetheless "provide a remedy in tort or restitution for victims.""6
With its provisions limited to the definition, prosecution, and
punishment of the criminal offenses of genocide and genocide-
related acts, the Genocide Convention Implementation Act does
not provide such a civil remedy for victims. The Genocide
Convention is thus not obligatory upon the United States in such a
manner as to provide a basis for a private cause of action pursuant
to the ATCA.
511. Id. § 1091(d)(1)-(2).
512. Id. § 1092.
513. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF U.S. § 404 (1987) ("A
state has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for certain offenses recognized
by the community of nations as of universal concern.").
514. Id.





The right to be free from discrimination on the basis of race
or ethnicity is recognized in the ICCPR. This Covenant provides
each state is to undertake "to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the
rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of
any kind, such as race, color ... [or] national .. .origin. 51 7 The
meaning of the terms "race," "color," and "national origin" are
self-evident and do not require definitions in order to be specific.
This nondiscrimination provision is applicable to all individuals
and all rights secured by the Covenant. No derogation from the
Covenant's provisions is permitted if it is based solely on racial
discrimination.5 "' Furthermore, as previously established, ICCPR is
universally accepted.
These provisions, however, are not obligatory for two
reasons. First, as is also the case with other provisions of the
ICCPR, Article 2 is not self-executing. 19 Even assuming this
provision to be self-executing, the language of Article 2 lacks a
mandatory nature. Rather than requiring states to disregard race
in the implementation of the rights established by ICCPR, Article
2 provides only that states "undertake to respect and ensure" these
rights without discrimination.12  This language implies states
attempt to extend such rights without distinctions based on race.
States may satisfy their obligations as long as such efforts are
underway regardless of their ultimate success. Language clearly
mandating efforts to eliminate discrimination and requiring their
ultimate success was available, but apparently overlooked, by the
drafters. As a result, the race and ethnicity provision within
ICCPR is not obligatory.
For similar reasons, the race provisions within the ICESCR
also are not obligatory. In a manner similar to ICCPR, the
ICESCR provides states "undertake to guarantee that the rights
enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without
discrimination of any kind as to race, color . . . [or] national
origin.' 52' The meaning of the terms "race," "color," and "national
517. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 69, art. 2(1).
518. Id. art. 4(1).
519. ICCPR CONG. REC., supra note 243, art. 3(1).
520. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 69, art. 2(1).
521. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 69,
art. 2(2).
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origin" are once again self-evident. The nondiscrimination
provision is expressly applicable to all rights secured by the
122
Covenant. Furthermore, as previously established, the ICESCR
is universally accepted.
However, these provisions are not obligatory for two reasons.
First, the ICESCR is nonobligatory due to the absence of U.S.
ratification. Even assuming the absence of such ratification had no
relevance to its obligatory nature, the language of the Covenant
itself overcomes any attempt to render its provisions mandatory.
Article 2(2) provides only that states "undertake to guarantee"
523these rights without discrimination. Although the utilization of
the term "guarantee" commands greater mandatory meaning than
its counterpart in the ICCPR, this language still leads to the
conclusion that states may satisfy their obligations as long as they
undertake such efforts with the belief such efforts will ultimately
prove successful. Far more specific language, including methods by
which states are to implement the ICESCR and reference to the
time within which the goals of the ICESCR were to be achieved,
was apparently ignored by the drafters. In addition, Article 2(1)
conditions achievement of the ICESCR's goals on availability of
state resources.12' Additional evidence of the nonobligatory nature
of the ICESCR exists in Article 4 which permits states to limit the
enjoyment of such rights on the amorphous basis on compatibility
with "the general welfare in a democratic society...... As a result,
the race provision within the ICESCR is not obligatory.
The right to be free from discrimination is extended to
children by the CRC, which requires states to take "all appropriate
measures to ensure that the child is protected against all forms of
discrimination or punishment on the basis of status. 526 This right is
rendered nonspecific by the failure of the CRC to define what is
intended by the prohibition upon discrimination based upon
"status." Further uncertainty results from the remainder of this
provision which prohibits such discrimination based not on the
child's "status" but rather the "status of the child's parents, legal
guardians or family members. 5 27 Even assuming "status" can be
522. Id.
523. Id.
524. Id. art. 2(1).
525. Id. art. 4.




equated to race or ethnicity, the CRC is not actionable pursuant to
the ATCA due to the absence of U.S. ratification.
Race discrimination is specifically addressed in the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination. This instrument is the most widely-
recognized human rights convention relating to race discrimination
having been ratified or acceded to by 177 states at the time of
preparation of this Article.528 Unlike the previously discussed
instruments, the Convention defines those actions constituting
race discrimination."' By elaborating upon discriminatory acts, the
basis for such acts and the intent or result of such acts, this
definition lends a degree of specificity not present in other
covenants and conventions. States condemn racial discrimination
as defined in the Convention and pledge to "undertake to pursue
by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating
racial discrimination in all its forms. 53. This pledge to undertake
steps leading to the elimination of racial discrimination may be
criticized for lack of specificity and obligatory nature as previously
set forth with respect to similar language in the ICCPR and
ICESCR. However, unlike the language in these Covenants, the
Convention on Racial Discrimination provides a chronological
reference, specifically, "without delay." Furthermore, Article 2
elaborates on the type of activities states are required to
undertake, including elimination of acts or practices of
discrimination by public authorities and institutions, refraining
from sponsoring, defending or supporting racial discrimination,
amending, rescinding or nullifying laws having the effect of
creating or perpetuating racial discrimination, and adopting
legislation to bring such discrimination to an end within its
jurisdiction."'
528. Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties,
supra note 241, at 11.
529. Article 1(1) defines "racial discrimination" as:
[Any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, color,
descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying
or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social,
cultural or any other field of public life.
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art.
1(1), Sept. 28, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
530. Id. art. 2(1).
531. Id. art. 2(1)(a)-(d).
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The Convention also requires states to guarantee equal
treatment before all tribunals, security of the person, political
rights and economic, social and cultural rights without racial
distinctions.32 It may be concluded from this language that the
Convention on Racial Discrimination is specific, universal, and
obligatory. However, the Convention is rendered nonobligatory as
a result of its ratification by the United States. Although the
United States ratified the Convention on Racial Discrimination
effective November 1994, the substantive provisions of the
Convention were declared to be non-self-executing.533 As such, the
Convention on Racial Discrimination is not actionable pursuant to
the ATCA.
The right to be free from racial discrimination has been
identified as part of the customary international law of human
rights pursuant to Section 702 of the Restatement of Foreign
Relations Law."' Freedom from such practices is further defined as
jus cogens5" Nevertheless, these designations do not necessarily
render it actionable pursuant to Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.
Based on Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, only a portion of the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination is obligatory upon the United States in such a
manner as to provide a basis for a private cause of action pursuant
to the ATCA. Unlike torture and summary execution, the
justiciability of racial discrimination practiced against persons not
within the jurisdiction of the United States is limited. Although
civil rights claims alleging discrimination on the basis of race are
actionable pursuant to Title 42 of the United States Code, most
such actions are limited to citizens of the United States or those
532. Id. art. 5(a)-(e). Political rights include the right to vote and stand for election,
take part in the conduct of public affairs and enjoy equal access to public service. Id. art.
5(c). Economic, social and cultural rights include rights to freedom of movement and
residence, the right to leave the country and return, the right to nationality, marriage and
choice of spouse, property rights (including inheritance), freedom of thought, conscience,
religion, opinion, expression, assembly and association, free choice of employment, and
the rights to housing, health care, participation in cultural activities and access to places
and services available to the general public. Id. art. 5(d)-(f).
533. U.S. Reservations, Declarations and Understandings, International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 140 CONG. REC. S7634-02, art.
3 (daily ed. June 24, 1994).
534. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF U.S. § 702(f) (1987)
("A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages
or condones ... systematic racial discrimination.").
535. Id. cmt. n.
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136within its jurisdiction. Protections extended to make and enforce
contracts, sue, participate in civil and criminal proceedings as a
party or witness, and enjoy the "full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of persons and property" are only
applicable to "persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States. 537 Protections with respect to the inheritance, purchase,
lease, sale, holding, and conveyance of property rights are similarly
extended only to citizens of the United States.538 The civil liability
provided by Title 42 of the U.S. Code for every person who, under
color of law, deprives another of any rights, privileges or
immunities secured by the Constitution is also limited to U.S.
citizens or other persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States. The same conclusion is applicable to determining
eligibility for federal benefits.5 °
There are some rights upon which race cannot be used as a
discriminatory factor and thus making violations of those rights
actionable by persons outside the jurisdiction of the United States.
For example, the right to "full and equal enjoyment" of goods,
services, facilities, and places of public accommodation regardless
of race, color, or national origin is extended to "all persons"
regardless of their citizenship or the presence of U.S. jurisdiction. 4'
Such persons are also entitled to be free, at any such
establishment, from discrimination on the basis of race, color, or
'national origin required by any "law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, rule or order.5 ..2 District courts possess subject matter
jurisdiction with respect to all claims alleging violation of these
rights.43
The same conclusion may be reached with respect to the
prohibition of unlawful employment practices. Title 42 defines
such practices to include refusals to hire, discharges and
discrimination with respect to compensation, terms, conditions or
privileges of employment on the basis of race, color, or national
536. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983 (2000).
537. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2000).
538. Id. § 1982.
539. Id. § 1983.
540. Id. § 2000d.
541. Id. § 2000a. This section provides that "[a]ll persons shall be entitled to the full
and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages and
accommodations of any place of public accommodation . . . without discrimination or
segregation on the ground of race, color ... or national origin." Id.
542. Id. § 2000a-1.
543. Id. § 2000a-6.
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origin." The limitation, segregation, or classification of employees
on such basis also is unlawful to the extent it deprives persons of
employment opportunities or adversely affects their status as an
employee. 45 Persons for purposes of the employment provisions of
Title 42 are defined to include individuals without reference to
citizenship or their presence within the jurisdiction of the United
States. 6 Although subsequent sections exempt the employment of
aliens under certain circumstances,147  the prohibitions upon
discrimination on the basis of race, color, and national origin
remain with respect to the operation of business entities
incorporated in a foreign state but controlled by a U.S. employer."'
Thus, to the extent federal statutory law protects the rights of non-
citizens and such protections overlap with protections set forth
within the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, aliens may utilize U.S. courts to assert their right
to be free from discrimination on the basis of race, color, or
national origin.
The remaining five instruments relating to race discrimination
consist of U.N. General Assembly resolutions and an instrument
within the Inter-American system of human rights. Three of these
instruments specifically prohibit states from conditioning
enjoyment of the rights provided therein on the basis of race,
color, or national origin. 9 As previously noted, the terms "race,"
544. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
545. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
546. Id. § 2000e(a).
547. Id. § 2000e-l(a) ("This subchapter shall not apply to an employer with respect to
the employment of aliens outside any State."); see also § 2000e-l(b) (exempting
compliance with equal employment opportunity practices in the event such compliance
would violate the laws of the foreign jurisdiction where the employment services are
rendered); § 2000e-1(c)(2) (exempting compliance with equal employment opportunity
practices with respect to the foreign operations of an employer that is not a foreign person
controlled by a U.S. employer).
548. Id. § 2000e-l(c)(1) (requiring compliance with equal employment opportunity
practices by employers incorporated pursuant to foreign law but controlled by a U.S.
employer). Control is determined by examination of "the interrelation of operations; the
common management; the centralized control of labor relations; and the common
ownership or financial control of the employer and the corporation." Id. § 2000e-
1(c)(3)(A)-(D).
549. Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National, Ethnic, Religious or
Linguistic Minorities, G.A. Res. 47/135, art. 2(1)-(2), U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., 92d plen.
mtg., U.N. Doc. 471135 (Dec. 18, 1992) ("Persons belonging to national or ethnic ...
minorities ... have the right to enjoy their own culture ... [and] participate effectively in
cultural .. .social, economic and public life."); see also American Declaration on the
Rights and Duties of Man, supra note 97, art. 2 ("All persons are equal before the law. ..
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"color," and "national origin" are self-evident and do not require
definitions in order to be specific. Furthermore, in a manner
similar to the previously discussed covenants, the
nondiscrimination provisions are expressly applicable to all rights
secured by these declarations. In addition, two instruments require
states to protect the rights of racial and ethnic minorities or a
designated population within their jurisdiction from discrimination
on the basis of race, ethnicity or national originY° By contrast, one
instrument simply acknowledges all forms of discrimination as
inconsistent with the goals of social progress and development:"'
This acknowledgement lacks specificity to the extent it fails to
prohibit discrimination with respect to the enjoyment of an
identified right or requires states to take action to protect the
rights of racial or ethnic minorities. In any event, despite the
universality of these instruments, they are not obligatory given
their declaratory nature.
3. Discrimination on the Basis of Religion
The right to be free from discrimination on the basis of
religious affiliation or practice is recognized in the ICCPR. The
ICCPR requires each state to undertake "to respect and to ensure
to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction
the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction
of any kind, such as ... religion.""' 2 As noted with respect to the
terms "race," "color," and "national origin," "religion" is self-
evident and does not require a definition in order to be specific.
This nondiscrimination provision is expressly applicable to all
individuals and all rights secured by the Covenant without
derogation.53
without distinction as to race."); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 97,
art. 2 ("Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration,
without distinction of any kind, such as race, color.., or national origin.").
550. Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National, Ethnic, Religious or
Linguistic Minorities, supra note 549, art. 1(1)-(2) ("States shall protect the existence and
the ... ethnic ... identity of minorities within their respective territories" and "shall adopt
appropriate legislative and other measures to achieve those ends."); see also Declaration
on the Rights of the Child, supra note 313, art. 10 (providing children are entitled to
protection from racial discrimination).
551. Declaration on Social Progress and Development, supra note 331, art. 12(b)
(noting social progress and development require "[t]he elimination of all forms of
discrimination").
552. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 69, art. 2(1).
553. Id. art. 4(1).
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Despite the universal acceptance of the ICCPR, its religious
discrimination provisions are not obligatory due to their non-self-
executing nature. In addition, Article 2 merely requires states to
"undertake to respect and ensure" rights without religious
discrimination, thereby permitting states to satisfy their obligations
without regard to their ultimate success.554 As a result, the religion
provision within the ICCPR is not obligatory.
For similar reasons, the religious discrimination provision
within the ICESCR also is not obligatory. The ICESCR provides
that states "undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in
the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of
any kind as to . . . religion." '555 Furthermore, as previously
established, the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Covenant is
universally accepted. However, this provision is not obligatory due
to the absence of U.S. ratification. Furthermore, as previously
noted with respect to race discrimination, the language of the
Covenant focusing on efforts to prevent discrimination rather than
their ultimate success and conditioning such efforts on state
resources and "the general welfare in a democratic society"
renders the nondiscrimination provisions nonobligatory.556
Freedom from religious discrimination is extended to children
by the CRC, which requires states to take "all appropriate
measures to ensure that the child is protected against all forms of
discrimination or punishment on the basis of status." ' This right is
rendered nonspecific by the failure of the Convention to define
what is intended by the prohibition upon discrimination based on
the child's "status" or that of his parents, legal guardians, or family
members. Even assuming "status" can be equated to religious
practices, the CRC is not actionable pursuant to the ATCA due to
the absence of U.S. ratification.
The CRC also requires states to respect the right of children
to freedom of religion. 58 However, this freedom is subject to
numerous undefined exceptions. These exceptions include legally
imposed restraints "necessary to protect public safety, order,
health or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of
554. Id. art. 2(1).
555. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 69,
art. 2(2).
556. Id. art. 2(2).
557. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 96, art. 2(2).
558. Id. art. 14(1).
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others."5'9 No explanation of these restrictions is offered in the
Convention. It appears, however, that any restraint is permissible
assuming it is adopted pursuant to law and can in some manner be
related to public necessity or the rights of others. Leaving aside the
issue of the absence of U.S. ratification of the Convention, such a
standard lacks specificity and defies application by courts seeking
to determine if a particular restraint possesses the necessary
justification.
Unlike racial discrimination, the right to be free from
discrimination on the basis of religion is also set forth in Geneva
Convention IV and Protocol II. 6°  Article 27 of Geneva
Convention IV states all protected persons are entitled to
"respect" for their religious practices and convictions.561 Similar
protection is accorded to victims of non-international armed
conflict by Protocol 11.162 However, Geneva Convention IV
conditions such respect on the adoption of control and security
measures as necessitated by war.
5 63
The universal nature of these conventions is beyond question.
However, neither of these conventions is actionable pursuant to
the ATCA. Initially, both conventions lack the requisite degree of
specificity. The requirement to respect religious practices of
affected populations is readily definable to the extent it prohibits
actions such as forcible conversion, destruction of places of
worship and prohibitions upon religious rites. Beyond these
readily abhorrent practices, the parameters of the required respect
remain indeterminate. These parameters are all the more difficult
to ascertain given the exception for control and security measures
set forth in Geneva Convention IV. This exception could in fact
swallow the protection wholesale by permitting interference with
the conduct of religious rituals or, in extreme cases, the destruction
of places of worship on the bases of the need to assert control of a
particular area or collective security. Such an exception is
particularly vague in circumstances involving armed conflict in
559. Id. art. 14(2).
560. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 262, art. 28; Protocol II, supra note 263, art.
4(1).
561. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 262, art. 28.
562. Protocol 1I, supra note 263, art. 4(1) (requiring respect for religious convictions
and practices of civilians during non-international armed conflicts).
563. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 262, art. 27 ("Parties to the conflict may take
such measures of control and security in regard to protected persons as may be necessary
as a result of the war.").
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which instantaneous decisions are often required by military
personnel possessing broad discretion and perhaps operating with
incomplete knowledge.
Furthermore, neither of these instruments is obligatory upon
the United States. Despite its ratification by the United States,
Geneva Convention IV is not obligatory as there is no evidence it
is self-executing or that such result was intended at the time of
ratification.5" Despite its universal nature, Protocol II does not
create legally binding obligations due to the absence of ratification
by the United States. The limited possibility of application of
Geneva Convention IV and Protocol II to the activities of
multinational enterprises further minimizes their importance.
Freedom of religious practice is a feature of the Inter-
American system of human rights protections. Article 12 of the
American Convention on Human Rights grants everyone the right
to freedom of conscience and religion.56 ' This freedom is defined to
include the freedom to maintain or change one's beliefs and
individually or collectively profess and disseminate such beliefs in
private or public." States are prohibited from imposing restrictions
impairing the maintenance of religion or the ability to change
beliefs. 7 In establishing these rights, the American Convention
contains the most complete definition of religious freedom of any
human rights instrument.
Nevertheless, this specificity is overcome by limitations which
may be imposed pursuant to law for purposes of "public safety,
order, health or morals or the rights or freedoms of others.""' No
further explanation of these restrictions is offered in the
Convention, but they are at least as broad as limitations set forth
in the CRC. To the extent those limitations could be used to justify
any restrictions on the exercise of religion, the exceptions within
the American Convention present equal opportunities for the
imposition of restraints. Leaving aside the issues of universality
564. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF U.S. § 111(4)(a)-
(c) (1987) (providing the creation of a private remedy actionable in U.S. courts is
inconsistent with the general rule that affected individuals do not have direct remedies
against human rights violators except where expressly provided by international
agreement).
565. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 160, art. 12(1).
566. Id.
567. Id. art. 12(2).
568. Id. art. 12(3).
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and obligation given the absence of U.S. ratification of the
American Convention, such a standard defies judicial application.
The remaining five instruments relating to religious
discrimination consist of U.N. General Assembly resolutions and
an instrument within the Inter-American system of human rights.569
These instruments protect the profession of religious beliefs,
prohibit discrimination or require states to protect religious
expression.7 The most complete instrument in this regard is* the
Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or
Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities. The Declaration
provides for two of the three previously noted rights with respect
to religion. Article 2 grants members of religious minorities the
right to "profess and practice their own religion" and "participate
effectively" in religious life.57' States are obligated to protect the
existence of religious minorities. 572 This protection is to be
memorialized in "appropriate legislative and other measures......
Opportunities to develop and express religious beliefs are to be
encouraged through the creation of "favorable conditions" under
which such development and expression may occur."'
Although development and expression are subject to the
undefined vagaries of "national law" and "international
standards," the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to
National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities is
nonetheless more specific than its other declaratory counterparts.
The Universal and American Declarations prohibit states from
569. Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National, Ethnic, Religious or
Linguistic Minorities, supra note 549, arts. 1(1), 2(1)-(2) ("States shall protect the
existence and the ... religious ... identity of minorities within their respective territories"
and "[plersons belonging to... religious.., minorities ... have the right to... profess and
practice their own religion [and] participate effectively in . . . religious . . . life.");
Declaration on Social Progress and Development, supra note 331, art. 12(b) (noting social
progress and development require "[t]he elimination of all forms of discrimination");
Declaration on the Rights of the Child, supra note 313, art. 10 (providing children are
entitled to protection from religious discrimination); American Declaration on the Rights
and Duties of Man, supra note 97, art. 2 ("All persons are equal before the law.., without
distinction as to. .. creed."); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 97, arts.
2, 18 ("Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration,
without distinction of any kind, such as . . . religion" and "[e]veryone has the right to
freedom of thought, conscience and religion.").
570. Id.
571. Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National, Ethnic, Religious or
Linguistic Minorities, supra note 549, art. 2(1)-(2).
572. Id. art. 1(1).
573. Id. art. 1(2).
574. Id. art. 4(2).
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conditioning enjoyment of the rights provided therein on the basis
of religion.7 ' In a manner similar to the Declaration on the Rights
of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or
Linguistic Minorities, the Declaration of the Rights of the Child
requires states to protect children from religious discrimination.576
By contrast, the Declaration on Social Progress and Development
merely acknowledges that all forms of discrimination are
inconsistent with the goals of social progress and development.57
This acknowledgement lacks specificity to the extent it fails to
identify religious groups, beliefs, and practices as subject to
protection. In any event, despite the specificity of any of these
instruments and their universal acceptance, they are not obligatory
given their declaratory nature.
One further distinction between racial and religious
discrimination is worthy of mention. Unlike racial discrimination,
discrimination on the basis of religious beliefs or practices has not
been deemed to be jus cogens. Despite the absence of this
status, U.S. law has nonetheless recognized the importance of the
cause of international religious freedom. The primary legal
recognition of this freedom is set forth in the International
Religious Freedom Act of 1998.579 This statute recognizes the
importance of religion to the origin and existence of the United
States as well as its legacy for providing refuge for those suffering
religious persecution abroad."° The statute further recognizes the
universal nature of religious freedom." ' Given this heritage and the
universality of this freedom, the statute condemns religious
persecution, seeks to direct foreign assistance to states that do not
engage in gross violations of the right to freedom of religion,
restates U.S. commitment to securing religious liberty abroad, and
575. American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, supra note 97, art. 2
("All persons are equal before the law ... without distinction as to ... creed"); see also
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 97, art. 2 (providing "[e]veryone is
entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of
any kind, such as... religion.").
576. Declaration on the Rights of the Child, supra note 313, princ. 10 (providing
children are entitled to protection from religious discrimination).
577. Declaration on Social Progress and Development, supra note 331, art. 12(b)
(noting social progress and development require "[tihe elimination of all forms of
discrimination").
578. See BROWNLIE, supra note 152, at 515.
579. 22 U.S.C. §§ 6401-6481 (2000).
580. Id. § 6401(a)(1).
581. Id. § 6401(a)(2)-(3).
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renews efforts to secure such liberty through appropriate
diplomatic, political, commercial, charitable, educational and
cultural channels. 582 These initiatives and commitments are
established as official U.S. policy.
The president is authorized to respond to violations of
religious freedoms, including those deemed to be "particularly
severe," through condemnation, cancellation of exchanges,
suspension of financial and security assistance, and denial of
export licenses and procurement opportunities." Despite the
recognition of the importance of religious freedom, the
International Religious Freedom Act does not grant standing to
private parties to initiate litigation in the United States with
respect to international violations of such right.18 ' Rather, the sole
remedies rest in the exercise of presidential discretion. 6 The
initiation of private litigation could interfere with the executive
branch's conduct of foreign policy and ability to speak with one
voice on behalf of the United States.587 This possibility, as well as
the absence of an express statutory grant of private standing,
differentiates religious discrimination from jus cogens offenses
such as torture and enforced disappearance.
582. Id. § 6401(b).
583. Id.
584. Id. §§ 6441-6442, 6445(a). Violations of religious freedoms are defined as:
[A]rbitrary prohibitions on, restrictions of, or punishment for ... assembling for
peaceful religious activities such as worship, preaching, and prayer, including
arbitrary registration requirements; speaking freely about one's religious beliefs;
changing one's religious beliefs and affiliation; possession and distribution of
religious literature, including Bibles; or raising one's children in the religious
teachings and practices of one's choice; or any of the following acts if committed
on account of an individual's religious belief or practice: detention,
interrogation, imposition of an onerous financial penalty, forced labor, forced
mass resettlement, imprisonment, forced religious conversion, beating, torture,
mutilation, rape, enslavement, murder, and execution.
Id. § 6402(13)(A)-(B).
"Particularly severe violations of religious freedom" are defined to include "torture or
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged detention without
charges; causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction or clandestine detention of
those persons; or other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security of
persons." Id. § 6402(11).
585. Id. §§ 6401-6481.
586. Id. §§ 6331-6342.
587. See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (recognizing the
importance of the president's ability to speak for the United States with one voice in
matters of foreign policy).
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D. Human Rights Associated with Armed Conflict
1. War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity
Prohibitions upon the commission of war crimes and crimes
against humanity are set forth in the greatest detail in one human
rights instrument."' The Elements of Crimes as established by the
International Criminal Court contains the most definitive
description of war crimes ever enunciated by an international
body. War crimes are defined to include willful killing, torture and
cruel treatment, the infliction of great suffering, mutilation, rape
and other sexual violence, forced pregnancy, enforced prostitution
and sterilization, biological, medical and scientific
experimentation, destruction, pillaging and appropriation of
property, compelling military service in hostile forces, denial of
due process, deportation and displacement of civilians,
confinement, hostage taking, attacks upon civilian populations,
improper uses of flags and insignia, attacking protected objects,
and the use of poison and poisoned weapons."8
Crimes against humanity are defined in similar detail. The
International Criminal Court has defined crimes against humanity
to include murder, extermination, enslavement, forcible transfer of
civilian populations, imprisonment, torture, rape, sexual slavery,
enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization,
sexual violence, persecution, enforced disappearance, apartheid,
and other inhumane acts."n Each of these definitions establishes
the three fundamental elements to defining any offense,
specifically, the prohibited act, the identity of the victim, and the
requisite intent of the perpetrator.9 Although isolated elements of
588. Although war crimes and crimes against humanity are defined and subject to
prosecution and punishment by other human rights instruments, these documents are
limited to specific conflicts rather than operating without geographic or chronological
restraint. See, e.g., Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res.
955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994); Statute of the International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, S.C. Res. 827, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
589. Int'l Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, supra note 483, art. 8(2).
590. Id. art. 7.
591. For example, the war crime of willful killing is defined as the killing of one or
more persons, the membership of such persons in a protected class as established by the
Geneva Conventions and awareness on the part of the perpetrator of the factual
circumstances establishing the victim's protected status. Id. art. (8)(2)(a)(i). By contrast,
willful killing is defined as a crime against humanity if the perpetrator killed one or more
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some of the defined crimes are subject to interpretation, these
difficulties are extremely isolated and are of little impact upon the
otherwise overwhelmingly specificity of the code.592 Instead, this
elaboration of crimes was deemed specific enough by the one
hundred ratifying states to serve as the basis for the abdication of
national sovereignty in favor of international criminal
prosecution.5 93 As such, it would undoubtedly be specific enough to
serve as the basis for tort claims alleged as part of a civil lawsuit.
Nevertheless, as previously discussed with respect to the right
to be free from genocide, the universal and obligatory nature of
the documents establishing the International Criminal Court are
subject to question. Approximately one-half of the international
community has ratified or acceded to the Rome Statute. 94
Although significant, this history raises serious questions with
respect to the universal recognition of the Court as well as the
principles for which it stands including the definition of war crimes
and crimes against humanity. Even assuming the Rome Statute
and International Criminal Court have been universally
recognized, the Statute is not obligatory on the United States due
to the absence of ratification. Assuming the universality of the
Statute and the definitions set forth therein and their acceptance
by the United States, there is no reason to believe the U.S. Senate
would manifest an intention for it to serve as the basis for civil
litigation pursuant to the ATCA. With its provisions limited to the
definition, prosecution and punishment of the war crimes, the
Rome Statute does not provide such a civil remedy for genocide
victims.
persons as part of "a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian
population" and the -perpetrator knew or intended the conduct to be part of such an
attack. Id. art. 7(1)(a).
592. Examples in this regard include the terms "severe" or "great" physical or mental
pain in defining the war crime of inhuman treatment and humiliating or degrading
treatment utilized in establishing the war crime of outrages upon personal dignity. Id. arts.
8(2)(a)(ii)(2), (2)(a)(iii), (2)(b)(xxi), (2)(c)(i)-3 to -4, (2)(c)(ii). Similar difficulties may
arise from the terms "great suffering" and "serious injury to body or to mental or physical
health" used in the definition of inhumane acts within the article relating to crimes against
humanity. Id. art. (7)(1)(k).
593. Currently, there are 100 state parties to the ICC. See American Non-
Governmental Organizations Coalition for the International Criminal Court, ICC
Ratifications, http://www.amicc.org/icc-ratifications.html.
594. United Nations, Ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, supra note 487, at 1.
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In a manner similar to piracy, war crimes are also offenses
which states possess universal jurisdiction to define and punish.9
As piracy has been determined to be one of the offenses originally
intended to be within the scope of the ATCA, it may be concluded
war crimes are also actionable. However, despite universal status,
there must still be a basis for the initiation and prosecution of a
private civil action through appropriate provisions within national
law. Universal jurisdiction has been traditionally exercised in the
form of criminal prosecution. Although universal jurisdiction
does not preclude the application of civil law to such offenses, the
state must nonetheless provide a private remedy. 97 U.S. law
provides no such civil remedy for war crime victims.598 This failure
is further evidence the responsibilities arising from the
International Criminal Court are not obligatory on the United
States as to provide a basis for a private cause of action pursuant
to the ATCA.
2. Displacement of Civilian Populations
The ICCPR grants everyone lawfully within the territory of a
state the freedom to choose his residence.599 This right is not
subject to restrictions other than as adopted by law or necessary
for the protection of "national security, public order, public health
or morals or the rights and freedoms of others.""6 In addition,
states are prohibited from engaging in "arbitrary or unlawful
interference" with an individual's right to his or her home.' The
ICCPR makes no further reference to rights associated with
residence or the establishment and maintenance of one's home.
To the extent such rights can be equated with a prohibition
upon forcible displacement of civilian populations, the exceptions
render them nonspecific for purposes of judicial enforcement. No
595. See Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction's
Hollow Foundation, 45 INT'L L. J. 183,188 (2004).
596. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF U.S. § 404, cmt. b
(1987).
597. Id.
598. U.S. law only provides for criminal liability for perpetrators of war crimes. 18
U.S.C. § 2441(a) (providing for fine, imprisonment and potential death sentence for
persons convicted of committing war crimes inside or outside of the United States).
599. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 69, art. 12(1)
("Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the
right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.").
600. Id. art. 12(3).
,601. Id. art. 17(1).
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explanations of these exceptions are offered in the Covenant.
Beyond physical violence or the threat thereof utilized against a
civilian population resulting in the abandonment of residences, the
parameters of the exceptions remained undefined. As such, any
interference is permissible even if it is not legally sanctioned,
assuming it can in some manner be related to national security,
public necessity or preservation of the rights of others. The task of
defining the limitations of these exceptions is more onerous given
the difficulties inherent in determining the scope of state police
powers to ensure national security and protect public health,
order, and morals. The breadth of these powers eases the burden
on states to demonstrate the necessity of their exercise. In
addition, the use of the term "arbitrary" in Article 17(1) implies
such restrictions will be invalidated only in instances where they
lack substantial evidentiary support.
This uncertainty as to the circumstances under which states
may interfere with the freedom to choose one's residence and
interfere with one's home also defeats the obligatory nature of
these provisions. Despite the alleged mandatory nature of these
rights, they are nonobligatory to the extent they can be readily
evaded utilizing the broad and vague language of the exceptions.
Furthermore, the indefinite nature of the exceptions renders
successful judicial challenge to their utilization unlikely, either due
to the inability to exclude state action from their breadth or
judicial unwillingness to countermand actions deemed lawful and
necessary by foreign governments. This conclusion is further
bolstered by the non-self-executing nature of the ICCPR.
Identical issues plague similar rights established by the CRC
and the ACHR. Article 16 of the CRC prohibits "arbitrary or
unlawful interference" with children's homes. ' By contrast,
Article 22 of the ACHR grants every person the right to reside in
territories in which they are lawfully present. 3 However, this right
is subject to restrictions necessary to "prevent crime or to protect
national security, public safety, public order, public morals, public
health or freedoms of others."6
If such rights may be interpreted to include prohibition of
forcible displacement of civilian populations, the exceptions
render them nonspecific. In a manner similar to the ICCPR, no
602. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 96, art. 16(1).
603. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 160, art. 22(1).
604. Id. art. 16(3).
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explanations of these exceptions are offered in either Convention.
With respect to the ACHR, any interference short of physical
violence or the threat thereof may be deemed is permissible as log
as it can be related to crime suppression, national security, public
necessity or preservation of the rights of others. The broad scope
of the police powers and judicial acquiescence to state definitions
make the establishment of limitations all the more difficult. In a
manner similar to Article 17 of the ICCPR, the use of the term
"arbitrary" in the CRC implies such restrictions will be invalidated
only in instances where they lack substantial evidentiary support.
This is a very unlikely occurrence other than with respect to the
most egregious violations. This uncertainty as to the circumstances
under which states may interfere with the freedom to choose one's
residence and interfere with one's home further defeats the
obligatory nature of these provisions. Finally, neither instrument is
obligatory given the absence of U.S. ratifications.
Displacement of civilian populations is specifically prohibited
by Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions. Article 17 provides, in
part, "[t]he displacement of civilian populations shall not be
ordered for reasons related to [non-international armed]
conflict." 5 However, this prohibition may be disregarded for
purposes of ensuring the security of such civilians or other
"imperative military reasons." 6 Although more specific than the
rights to move about and be free from arbitrary interference with
one's residence, these limitations render the right to be free from
forcible displacement nonspecific. The determination of the need
to provide security for civilian populations is committed to the
discretion of the political branches as well as military commanders.
The likelihood of judicial questioning of such exercises of
discretion is unlikely especially given the absence of any
requirement of necessity for such evacuation. Even broader is the
exception for "imperative military reasons" which are also
committed to the discretion of the political branches and military
commanders and a most unlikely subject for judicial consideration
let alone condemnation. 60 These exceptions seriously impede any
judicial enforcement of the right to be free from displacement, if
not remove this right, entirely from such consideration.
Furthermore, despite its universal nature, Protocol II does not





create legally binding obligations due to the absence of ratification
by the United States and is further minimized in importance by the
limited circumstances to which it is applicable.
Finally, the relevant U.N. declarations are not specific or
obligatory to serve as the basis for private civil litigation. The
UDHR contains no express prohibition upon the displacement of
civilian populations. Rather, it merely prohibits "arbitrary
interference" with the maintenance of one's home."8 This right is
nonspecific to the extent that any interference may be justified on
the basis it is supported by substantial evidence and is thus not
arbitrary. Furthermore, unlike previous instruments establishing
this right, there is no accompanying list of circumstances justifying
restrictions. Thus, any restriction is permissible assuming it has
some evidentiary support in order to escape characterization as
arbitrary.
By contrast, the Declaration on the Protection of Women and
Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict specifically addresses
forced displacement of civilians. Article 5 requires states to
prosecute the forcible eviction of women and children by
belligerents as crimes."9 "Forcible eviction" is a broad term
encompassing any and all ousters which involve force of any kind
regardless of severity or the identity of the party to whom it is
directed.61° Furthermore, Article 5 does not contain any exceptions
under which such evictions may be justified. However, despite its
broad prohibition, lack of exceptions, and universal nature, it is
nonobligatory in the same manner as the Universal Declaration
due to its status as a statement of aspirations rather than of
binding principles of law.
V. CONCLUSION
The optimism with which human rights advocates greeted the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain is
unwarranted. The only claims asserted against transnational
corporations surviving Sosa are those alleging summary and
extrajudicial execution, torture, and perhaps racial discrimination.
The door which Justice Souter described as "still ajar" with respect
to "a narrow class of [modern] international norms" is shut to
608. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 97, art. 12.
609. Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed
Conflict, supra note 388, art. 5.
610. Id.
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other human rights claims absent a change of direction by the
Court or congressional guidance." '
As a result, transnational corporations have been largely
freed from the restraints imposed upon their behavior by the
ATCA and holdings of federal courts in the twenty-five years since
the groundbreaking decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in Filartiga v. Pehia-Irala.612 The opinion in Sosa
further weakens the contention that transnational corporations are
"right-and-duty-bearing unit[s]" pursuant to national and
international law. 613 This characterization of transnational
corporations is of particular importance due to their unique role as
de facto ambassadors of the United States and propagators of
American economic, political, and cultural values."'
Accountability for compliance with international human
rights standards will be increasingly dependent upon efforts
independent of litigation in U.S. federal courts. Shareholders and
potential investors may impact compliance with such standards
through socially responsible investing and divestiture, especially if
conducted by institutional investors. National governments,
international organizations, and non-governmental organizations
also may impact compliance through the adoption of initiatives
designed to establish, preserve and protect basic human rights.615
However, the primary burden for ensuring compliance with human
rights standards will be placed upon transnational corporations
themselves. This burden may be met by a commitment to human
rights as evidenced by codes of conduct, statements of corporate
principles, ethical guidelines, social accountability standards,
voluntary reporting efforts and similar initiatives. A critique of the
611. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. at 752 (2004).
612. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
613. John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE
L.J. 655,656 (1926).
614. Breed, supra note 6, at 1006, 1012.
615. See, e.g., Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, supra note 5, qI 2-14; United Nations
Global Compact Org., What is the Global Compact? (2000),
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights &
Labor, U.S. Dep't of State, Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (2000),
http://www.state.gov/g/dr~lrls/2931.htm; Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev. [OECD],
Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, The OECD
Declaration and Decisions on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises: Basic
Texts, OECD Doc. DFFE/IME(2000)20 (Nov. 8, 2000); Social Accountability Int'l,
Overview of S.A. 8000 (2002), http://www.sa-intl.org (follow "SA8000" hyperlink) (last
visited Aug. 8, 2006).
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effectiveness of these efforts is beyond the scope of this article.6 '6 It
suffices to note that the entrustment of the protection of human
rights to transnational corporations should give all parties,
including impacted populations, international and non-
governmental organizations, and human rights advocates,
considerable cause for alarm.
616. For a comprehensive discussion of the effectiveness of corporate codes of conduct
and other efforts to institutionalize human rights, see Mark B. Baker, Tightening the
Toothless Vise: Codes of Conduct and the American Multinational Enterprise, 20 WiS.
INT'L L.J. 89 (2001).
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